LIBRARY COPY

THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XIV NOVEMBER 1943 No. 11

CRIMINAL REFORM

Deliberately we choose the above title in preference to "Penal Reform." For the primary concern of any rational society *vis-à-vis* the problem of crime must be not with improved methods of punishment but with prevention and cure. How to protect society from crime and how to rehabilitate the criminal. These are not two separate problems. The ultimate good of the part is not separable from the good of the whole. The community has a right to protect itself, but the person against whom it seeks protection is one of its own members. The criminal must also be protected from society, which will continue to create criminals as well as punish them until it accepts in full the faith, often shaken but never shattered, in the common humanity of us all.

The apportionment of responsibility for crime is a difficult and delicate business. To view the average criminal as a monster, a *lusus naturæ*, is mistaken, but no more so than to absolve him, on the plea of determinism, of all blame for every lapse. Every one of us is in a sense the child of his circumstances. Many, tossed about on the angry billows of life no less violently than the criminal, do somehow manage to keep afloat, do avoid violating their conscience. For the morally weak the burden often seems too difficult to bear, but no more than the ordinary man who has escaped the attention of the courts is the criminal in his right mind the helpless pawn of heredity and environment. Denying him free-will, making of him a mere automaton, is the final insult to his manhood. Convincing the criminal that his crimes were inevitable in the circumstances is the greatest disservice you can do him. It cuts off at the root the possibility of self-reform. The aim of penal reform must be to reclaim the individual for society, never vindictiveness, never revenge. It may be the truest kindness to restrain the individual for a time, for his own good as well as that of society, from piling up entries

on the debit side until wise sympathy, coupled with mental, moral and manual training, shall awaken interest and rekindle self-respect.

We publish below an article on criminology which is provocative and suggestive. "Mark Benney," author of *Low Company*, who was introduced to our readers in 1937, has seen the problem from both sides. He is a reformed criminal, not because of but in spite of the modern penal institutions of which he had a varied experience and which he views as "part of the criminal problem, not an answer to it." His article is an arraignment of the modern economic and social order which fails to furnish worthy incentives and outlets for energy, a condemnation of an educational system which fails to open the door to wider interests and constructive efforts. There is no denying the guilt of society for economic and social conditions that positively tempt to crime.

It is of course more comfortable to view criminals as a race apart than to accept the sin and shame of the world as our sin and shame, to recognise the roots of evil in ourselves. But unless we see in our own lower nature the potential criminal we cannot call forth in the criminal the potential saint, who is in all surety there. And though we are not all criminals *de facto* we are all in a sense prisoners—prisoners to our limitations, to meaningless conventions, to our weaknesses.

A NEW APPROACH TO CRIMINOLOGY

It is difficult to think of the grim monumental prisons scattered throughout the civilised world as being the products of humanitarian enthusiasm. Gaunt grey dehumanised hives—as in general they are—it seems incredible that warm-hearted dreamers like Howard and Elizabeth Fry once fought mighty battles to achieve them. Yet, since this is the case, since the penal system with which our reformers are so ardently dissatisfied is itself the creation of ardent reformers, it will be instructive to inquire how this paradox has come about.

In August, 1935, the Eleventh International Penal and Penitentiary Congress met in Berlin to discuss and adopt resolutions on the principles and standards of penal administration. The proceedings make dull reading. There were some differences of opinion on such matters as whether prisoners should be paid for the work they did, what standard of life they should enjoy, etc. The real interest of the Congress, from our point of view, lay in what remained undiscussed and taken for granted: a broad uniform background of interests and understandings. A multitude of nations were represented, with the greatest divergences of tradition, history and social pattern: yet all relied on a funda-

mentally identical machinery of penal administration. The differences that emerged between, say, a Turkish prison and a Norwegian one were differences of achievement, not of purpose; of degree, not of kind. It is one of the most significant examples of Anglo-Saxon aggression—for this universal pattern of penal machinery, which today is accepted as natural by the most diverse nations, was conceived and thrust upon an unwilling world in the early nineteenth century by a mere handful of English and American reformers: Penn, Bentham, Howard, Oglethorpe.

The convictions upon which these reformers worked, and from which they derived their amazing energies, resolve into three elements: legal, ethical and psychological. They were convinced that any offence against the law was also an offence against God; they were scarcely less convinced that God would contrive his own punishment, and that society's part was simply to provide the offender with an opportunity to atone for his sins: and most of all they were convinced that atonement was most possible in solitude, cut off from all influences but those of religion. Such convictions led inevitably to the concept of the cellular prison—a sort of secular monastery designed for solitude and silence. Inevitably, too, the ideal had to be modified in execution: it was found to cost about eight times as much to build a prison designed for complete solitary confinement as one designed for the compromise system of "silent association." So, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the great wave of "model prison" building began; a cut-price programme. Today, practically every country in the world has built up its penal administration round one or other of the two archetypal models—Pentonville or Sing Sing.

The prison buildings have lasted; the convictions that produced them have proved less durable. It was the psychological premise that suffered first. It was found that solitude and silence did not necessarily lead the offender to make his peace with God: they were much more likely to lead to a permanent derangement of his mind, and the prison rules had to be progressively relaxed to prevent this. Gradually, too, a school of thought was growing which questioned the identity between law and ethics, a school which even began to assert that some laws might indeed be unethical. Scientists, elate with the triumphs of discovery their methods had won them in other fields, now turned their analytical weapons upon the individual and society itself, with the most disquieting results. The nineteenth century had a tremendous respect for figures, and when scientists came to demonstrate statistically that the incidence of crime was governed by factors outside the control of the individual offender, it was obvious that penological theory would have to be recast to accom-

modate the new facts. If the criminal could no longer be held wholly responsible for his own acts (and every day psychologists and sociologists were narrowing down the area of individual responsibility), punitive methods, whether undertaken by God or the State, had less and less ethical validity, and the last theoretical prop of the nineteenth-century prison system had gone. Before the twentieth century had gone very far most people who had given any thought at all to the problems of crime had arrived at a position where they accepted the existing penal machinery only because they could not think of anything more positively efficient to put in its place.

It was in America that the "model prisons" of the nineteenth century found their genesis; it is in America that the new theories are now emerging, which, most probably, will crystallise into new institutions to replace the old.

It is an unenviable honour. In few countries, ancient or modern, has crime been so pressing a problem as in America in the inter-war years; in few countries has the nineteenth-century solution of the model prison had so glaring an opportunity to demonstrate its inadequacy. By the late 'twenties organised crime had grown to such proportions in cities like New York and Chicago that it had become a "big business," threatening the well-being of legitimate big business. It was then that, as a measure of self-protection, a number of Chicago business magnates endowed the city's university so lavishly that the profession of criminology became almost as lucrative as that of crime, and other magnates in other cities followed suit. From that time on there was no possible avenue of research into criminal behaviour and relations that investigators could not afford to pursue; and the results of all this furious and free activity soon began to take positive and suggestive shape.

The basic view-point that all these researches point to would, to say the least, prove mildly surprising to a Victorian penologist. To put it briefly, crime is seen as a necessary social institution in the modern competitive industrial community. The economic insecurity inherent in such a society produces a general demand for drugs, prostitutes, gambling facilities, abortion, etc., and large rewards are offered when such services have to be met illicitly. Such demands ensure the continued existence of an organised community in spite of every effort at law enforcement. (In fact, the law itself has often to speak with two voices to criminals: for example, street book-makers are allowed to enter as legitimate professional expenses the fines they pay on behalf of their "runners.") And such an under-world is not only necessary, but positively useful. For, as well as catering to the vices of the non-criminal community, it also acts as a sump for much energy which cannot find legitimate

social expression and might otherwise find more dangerous outlets.

This last point is perhaps not easily appreciable, and requires elaboration. It may be stated thus: a young man who feels unbearably discontented with the world about him has theoretically hundreds of different means at his disposal for relieving his tension. If his feelings are violent enough, he may attempt murder or rape or arson; he may join a revolutionary party: he may become an enemy agent. Obviously, if he can be persuaded to find the same satisfaction by the mere act of picking someone's pocket or breaking into someone's house, the community in general is much better off. Here, then, is the under-world's other social function. It attracts and disciplines the newcomer to crime, it directs his antisocial impulses into established channels, it teaches him the traditions and techniques and rationalisations which for generations have proved satisfying for the criminal without proving intolerable to the state.

Seen from this view-point, the problems of criminology and penology become merged in the larger problems of social engineering. So long as there is a wide margin of the people to whom society offers so few legitimate satisfactions that they must have recourse to gambling, prostitutes, drugs and so on, or, failing these consolations, fall prey to the wild urgencies of frustration, so long there will be crime and criminals. Probation systems, Improved Schools, Borstal Institutions and Prisons will reform or deter a few individuals here and there, but there will be others to take their place. The real social function of these institutions is not to prevent crime, but to regulate it: not to reform criminals into honest men, but to re-form them into the sort of criminals that society has the greatest need for. Seen from the view-point of the new criminology, penal institutions are part of the criminal problem, not an answer to it.

To many these conclusions will appear cynical and pessimistic. They offer, it would seem, little encouragement to men and women of good-will who wish to know what attitude to adopt about prisons and prison reform. But that is to misunderstand the new attitudes. What the new criminologist really says is this: "The twentieth century has evolved a complicated machinery for the ostensible purpose of reforming and/or punishing criminals. Sometimes it succeeds in ostensibly reforming them, which usually means diverting their energies from one manifestation of social maladjustment to another; sometimes it fails in its ostensible task of reformation, which usually means that it has succeeded in transforming a potentially dangerous criminal into a relatively harmless one. As a criminologist, I am more impressed by the failures of this machinery than by its successes: they are more useful." If this still seems to you cynical and pessimistic, it means simply that

you are asking the wrong questions. A socially maladjusted person is a socially maladjusted person, whether he exhibits the fact by contracting venereal diseases in a brothel, by giving money to book-makers instead of to artists, by feeding his children on an inadequate diet or by burgling someone else's house. In all such cases the remedy is the old one, of finding some technique whereby to instil in the individual an adequate social awareness, and in society an adequate awareness of the individual.

Fortunately it can be claimed that the new criminology has made certain tentative discoveries which, for the first time, offer a way out of this impasse. The credit here must be shared between the Chicago criminologist Thrasher and the Austrian Aichhorn. Thrasher, in the course of prolonged study of gang behaviour, found that, while it was practically impossible to persuade the individual that he was "wrong" to join in gang delinquencies, it was often possible, by taking the gang *as* a gang, and applying a sort of group equivalent of psycho-analysis, to divert it to more satisfying and useful forms of activity. Aichhorn, too, finding himself at a dead-end in his efforts to deal with individual juvenile delinquents, had gratifying success when he extended his technique to include, as equal subjects, the delinquent's family-group. In both cases the essential novelty lies in finding a way to deal with social phenomena in social terms.

Such researches are still too young for us to attempt to sketch the kind of institution they are likely to produce in place of the prison. But it is interesting that Dr. Norwood East, the Medical Commissioner for prisons, has in his last two published reports on English criminals stressed the need for a penal "research centre," where not only abnormal but also certain normal types of offenders could be studied under suitable conditions: this is a wholly new conception within the frame of the English penal system, and, coming from such an official source, seems to indicate that the necessary experimental attitude will not be found wanting when the appropriate time arrives.

MARK BENNEY

THE INFLUENCE OF LITERATURE ON INDIA'S SOCIAL LIFE

[**Prof. Diwan Chand Sharma** is the author of *Our Indian Heritage* and of several other volumes. He writes here of the very important rôle of literature, with special reference to modern India.—ED.]

In all countries literature has influenced social life in three different ways. Generally speaking, people have looked upon it as a cementing and stabilising force, as something that keeps the social fabric intact and tells each man and woman the place where he or she belongs. It defines social relationships, assigns to everyone his or her place, and prescribes duties and obligations appropriate to every station. It is, in this sense, the literature of affirmation, for it reiterates those values of social life which have been sanctioned by time and approved by usage. This is the kind of literature which, according to some critics, produces a conservative and traditional outlook.

Then there is a kind of literature which points out the flaws in social life and the cracks in the social system. It influences either by satire or by direct or indirect exhortation, and engenders a desire for reform.

There is also a class of literature which shows a radical outlook on life. It does not support what is already established or question only a few of the facts already taken for granted, but seeks to overthrow all that exists. It is subversive in the eyes of some but life-giving in the eyes of others. It wants to destroy the old props of social life and wishes to base it on entirely different ideas and values.

Social life in India has been subjected to the influence of all these various kinds of literature. It should, however, be remembered that it is not only our indigenous literature that has shaped our life; the literatures of other countries also have had a vital share. Formerly it was only English literature that moulded our social philosophy, but now we are more international in our outlook in this respect. Russian literature has been a very potent influence with us and some of the Nobel Prize-winners have affected us greatly. These, combined with the writers of India, have caught us at the three levels mentioned above.

First, we have the epics of India and the literature based on or derived from them. All these, through so many centuries and in the midst of so many upheavals, have emphasised those values of life which are rooted in the past. Primarily, they have clarified the relationship that should subsist between the various members of a family, but they have also given expression to a social morality which can guide a tribe or a race. Over-

shadowing all these they have formulated a social code which is universally applicable. No wonder these books still exercise a living influence upon us, even though the percentage of literacy is so low in India. Their teachings and their doctrines percolate down to the masses in innumerable ways and become the touchstone of our social conduct. These have given us archetypes of many grades of social behaviour. A brother would like to approximate to the ideal set by Lakshmana and Sita will be the ideal of wifely devotion. In truth-telling, Yudhishthira will show the path and in valour Arjuna will be the model. In short, all the basic social relationships are adequately dealt with in these books, the influence of which still endures.

But social life, like everything human, is subject to deterioration because it is not always possible to distinguish what is valid for the time being and what is applicable for all time. For instance, it may be an ideal thing for a wife to remain faithful to her husband even though he is dead, but it may not be possible because human nature has so many limitations. Yet society, hide-bound by a formula handed down from the past, may insist on very strict adherence to this ideal with the result that widows may have no end of persecution. At such a time men of letters may come forward to redress the wrongs. This actually happened in the nineteenth century when Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar in Bengal and Maulana Hali in the Punjab voiced the distress of these widows. Both of these were actuated by humanitarian considerations and wrote noble verse and prose to awaken the conscience of society. They became in this way instruments of social reform, and turned literature into a weapon for social betterment. There are many Indian authors, poets, dramatists and writers of prose, who have advanced social reform through their writings. All these, from Raja Ram Mohan Roy to Munshi Prem Chand, have made use of argumentative and imaginative writing to advance social amelioration. They have not done this, however, by writing something dull, tedious and unimaginative, but something that has possessed genuine literary worth.

Of late a new tendency, mostly as a result of Western influences, has begun to manifest itself in India. We have a group of writers these days, writing through the medium of every Indian language and also in English, which aims at social revolution. These writers are not many but they are very effective and they are revolutionary not only in the content of their writings but also in technique and attitude. On their minds have played many influences, political, psychological and economic. The last part of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of writers with democratic sympathies who believed in the inherent dignity of man. But today we have writers who advocate so-

cialism not only in its humanitarian aspect but also in its economic aspect. Some have gone farther than this and appear as hot-gospellers of communism with all its implications. On the one hand, these writers describe the hard lives of the poor and dispossessed, and on the other they want to foment a social revolution which will lead to a classless society. Naturally in their writings there is a violent swing towards realism of a very sordid, degenerate kind. Allied to this is their emphasis on themes which show the aberrations of sex life. In this respect they have carried outspokenness to its utmost limit for they feel that repression (God knows what this word means !) is dangerous to health, peace of mind and happiness. They are inveterate foes of religion. They believe that organised religion has chained the human spirit, that religious institutions have been the handmaids of political and social tyranny and that ritualism has pauperised the human soul. They believe in the religion of humanity, which it is so difficult to define adequately. In a word, all these writers, amongst whom Mulk Raj Anand, Josh Malihabadi and Nazar-ul-Islam are prominent, are working towards a new concept of social relationships. This does not mean that they all embody the tendencies mentioned above. It only shows that they want to be the harbingers of a new era. In one sense they are doing with crude violence, loud emphasis and propagandist zeal what other writers have done with a sense of artistic restraint, social responsibility and historic continuity. The note of social unrest that we find in these writers was also in evidence in Rabindranath Tagore and Sarat Chandra Chatterjee. Both these writers gave expression to a sense of dissatisfaction with certain social institutions and placed especially under the search-light the relations between the sexes. But their criticism of social life did not become strident and hysterical. At best they laid bare some of the causes of social decay and sought readjustment in certain matters. But the writers of today are not content with these things and shout for a drastic overhauling of society. Naturally their influence is noticeable in the social life of today. Their gospel has gone home to the minds of the young more than to those of the older generation. They question the utility of every old social institution and wish to remould society after their heart's desire. *The passion for reconstruction which they show adds, on ultimate analysis, to the social chaos.* They can neither demolish nor rebuild, but they do swell the volume of discontent. Their case is pathetic if not tragic.

In addition to these three main streams of influence, there is another kind of influence which is in the main silent yet pervasive, and which has been playing upon our social life for several centuries and many generations. This has emanated

mainly from the Bhakti poets. Gujarat, Maharashtra, South India, Bengal, the North of India, all have had their groups of Bhakti poets. These have sweetened individual life and have been an influence for good in our corporate life. They have fortified the human heart and have proclaimed the essential kinship of humanity. They have risen above the barriers of caste and creed, of geography and history, and have made the heart of India vibrate to their songs.

Chaitanya, Chandidas and Vidyapati from Bengal, Miran and Narasinha Mehta from Gujarat, Tukaram from the Maharashtra, Buleshah and others from the Punjab, Kabir from the United Provinces and the Alwars from the south of India, all these have brought a message of love to the afflicted heart, a message of peace to the storm-tossed soul and a message of harmony to men divided in water-tight compartments. Above all, these inspired singers have kept alive the spirit of idealism, the devotion to something afar, which alone makes life significant. Even today their influence exists, though not in a very pronounced manner. It is the belief of many right-thinking persons that if our social life is to be based on the unity of the spirit, we have to seek guidance and support from these.

These are what may be described as the sociological influences of literature. It should, however, be borne in mind that the æsthetical and cultural influences of literature on our social life have also been very noticeable. It will be futile to enter into a controversy about the inseparableness of both these influences or about the priority of the one over the other. Suffice it to say that literature has refined and elevated our taste, has made our feelings more delicate, has added to the grace of social intercourse and has provided an outlet for our social discontents. In a word, it has humanised us. Novels, short stories, plays, essays, and above all poems, every one of these has been an educative influence in one sense or another. Naturally they have levelled up our social life.

When the late Mr. Montagu visited India, he heard a song sung by semi-literate persons in the depths of a dark forest. He wanted to know who the writer of that song was, but no one was able to tell him. The same song he heard again in an elegant drawing-room in a sophisticated city. He enquired again who the author was. He learnt, to his great surprise and delight, that it was a song composed by Rabindranath Tagore. He was amazed to find how this song could find an echo in the hearts alike of forest and city dwellers. This song is an emblem of the influence which literature has on our social life. It does not merely raise the level of our tastes; it also strengthens social solidarity. In spite of everything it brings us nearer to each other; it knits us closer and makes us realise that at heart we are one.

DIWAN CHAND SHARMA

MAX PLOWMAN: MAN OF VISION

[**R. H. Ward** writes about the late Max Plowman, who contributed a number of important articles to our earlier volumes, of which a series entitled "What Does Death Mean to You?" must be considered as of permanent value. There was another, a short essay—"Ripeness is All," which is worth re-reading. —Ed.]

Men are of differing grades and degrees of consciousness, a fact which egalitarian democracy tends to overlook. As certain organs of the human body are more necessary to its effective life than others, so are men of certain grades of consciousness more necessary to the effective life of the social body than others; if the eyes lose their sight, the effectiveness of the human body is at least very seriously impaired: it does not know where it is going; it cannot see what it is doing. It would appear to be the eyes of the social body which, at least in the West, have been defective in the last few centuries; society has lost its vision and, since where there is no vision the people perish, the people are now perishing in very truth. The eyes of society are those, once known as prophets and teachers, who in later ages have more often been poets or other kinds of imaginative artists. Such men are often erroneously said to be "before their time"; in recent history the fact that they have been considered "before their time" has been made an excuse for not listening to them. But in reality they are in no wise before their time; they belong to it quite unmistakably, are in fact the keepers of its conscience; but because they are gifted with vision they can see further than their own time, further back into the recesses of history, and further forward into the future. When they try to carry their contemporaries forward with them along the line of this vision and show them what must inevitably be the effect caused by their present behaviour, these contemporaries cannot or will not go with them. Once, perhaps, in what we are now pleased to call more primitive civilizations, it was still possible for the prophet to recall the people to the ways of righteousness; in more recent history the man of vison has, like Max Plowman's master, William Blake, been merely suffered to live in poverty and neglect, upheld by the grim satisfaction of knowing that one day, when it is already too late, thousands will hear and agree with what he had to say. Thus society has been brought to its present pass; having refused to use its eyes it is now blind and led by the blind; it does not know what it is doing, much less does it know where it is going; it knows only that it suffers, that some terrible and incomprehensible retribution has fallen upon it.

It will almost certainly be some

time before Max Plowman is given his proper place among the writers and thinkers of his day, though he is unlikely to have to wait as long as Blake waited; this is a period of rapid transition, the passing age is swiftly disintegrating and under the effect of that disintegration men and women are being forced to use again the eyes with which alone they can foresee the age which is to come. It is true that Max Plowman left a very small body of writings, and not all of them of the first order, but the same can be said of Keats and, as Mr. H. I'A. Fausset has pointed out, there are men today who live by the philosophy expressed in only a few of Keats's letters. And in a certain sense Max Plowman was not a writer and did not think of himself as one; an eminently creative person, possessed, it would seem, of all the attributes of literary genius, his writings yet appear to have been in some way incidental. Nor is this the place to discuss them in detail. Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of one reader at least, no better book on Blake has been written than his *Introduction to the Study of Blake*, while the essay on *Hamlet*, published in the posthumous book, admirably edited by his wife and called after one of the essays contained in it, *The Right to Live*, is hardly to be equalled as a piece of interpretative Shakespearean criticism.

But there is a certain sense of futility in these days in the attempt to exercise influence by writing. This is an age in which a man of poetic vision and imagination, a man who represents the last consciousness of that age and is capable of foreseeing the future, is moved to make the attempt to express in other ways than through the arts that faith to which his imagination brings him. It is clear to him that these are times of transition from one way of thinking and behaving to another, and that immeasurably much depends on what that other way of thinking and behaving will be. Must it be a return, as if round a vicious circle, to the same way of thinking and behaving which, through its adoption by past generations, has brought the generation of today to its present pass; or can it be a way of thinking and behaving which will take humanity out on a new curve of the evolutionary spiral and lead it to a fate at least a little less disastrous than mutual slaughter and economic, political and philosophic chaos?

It is true that we are all men of vision in some degree; but Max Plowman was a man of vision in great degree, who had his sense of eternal values, of beauty and truth, of the laws which, if we would but obey them, would hold men and their world in unity, so clear that this vision became a faith by which to live, and by which (an important point) he did in fact live. To a man who has attained this condition of consciousness, the situation he sees around him becomes too urgent, the state of the world too oppressively pitiable to permit of his

confining himself to the seclusion of his study. Almost certainly what he writes cannot in the circumstances but reach his fellow-men too late to influence their actions and mitigate their suffering.

So such a man is forced, even against many of his inclinations, to go out into the world and work directly in the world, making his creative activity not so much his words as his example; for example is the quickest and surest method of turning other men's hearts. It is not that a man like Max Plowman consciously and deliberately sets out to be the saviour of his fellow-men and of future generations; such men are humbler than that; they are driven, by their vision on the one hand and by the wretchedness of men on the other, to make the most realistic answer they can to the crying need of their times. Nor do they pause to think what may be the consequences to themselves, or, if they do, they know that consequences are in some way in other hands than theirs.

The market-place is not where the creative man feels most at home, or even most effective, however; there he must be among, not the great creative spirits of the past or the crowd of abstract truths that would people his own mind in solitude, but the crowd of men, the sightless mob, whose degree of consciousness is profoundly different from his own, making him an exile in a wilderness. Nevertheless, into the market-place many who in another age would probably have been contemplatives, have been forced by the condition of the modern world, and it was into the market-place that Max Plowman went when he accepted in 1936 the opportunity of becoming the general secretary of an organization for the promotion of peace. It was, as it happened, a choice between doing this and writing a book on Shakespeare; the point is significant in view of what has been said above. The choice was made and the book was never written, and those who read the published fragments of it will be hard put to it to understand in what true sense Max Plowman's choice was a wise one. Nor will their task be made easier by the reflection that the declaration of war in 1939 also declared this organization, and Max Plowman's work on its behalf, a virtual failure. Similarly, it will be difficult not to regret that, instead of returning to writing, Max Plowman, at the outbreak of war, became the warden of an experimental community (though a "community" was the last thing he would have it called) which, it was hoped, might be the foundation of a true *universitas* and an example in new ways of living, a cell of a new society. Inevitably, many in the future must regretfully compare the *Introduction to the Study of Blake* with these activities and conclude that they were not only failures but an employment of much time which might have been better spent in writing.

But it is doubtful whether Max

Plowman regretted time not spent in writing, and "failure" is one of the consequences in defiance of which such men, who "know what they fight for and love what they know," descend into the *mêlée*. And if it is true that nothing fails like success, perhaps it is also true that nothing succeeds like failure, in any case where "failure" of this kind is concerned. For at the time of his crucifixion, the attempts of Jesus to redeem the world, and his death on the cross as a consequence, must certainly have looked like failure; though Christians hold another view now. The fruits of certain kinds of creative activity are long-delayed; only time will show them, and even time will not always show them in the form expected, or remember where they originated. The good that men do, like the evil, lives after them. "We do not," as Mr. Shaw has said, "lose a good man by his death," though it may, at the time of his death, and even long afterwards, be hard to see the point at which, and the form in which, he rises to life again.

It is part of the wisdom of the man of vision to know what is the most obvious manifestation of a general spiritual sickness and to make this his point of contact with his fellows in the market-place. Max Plowman was a "pacifist" because he saw war as the self-declaration in palpable form of a deep-seated social and psychological evil. It was, therefore, towards the antithesis of war that he set his heart and the foreseeing eye of his vision and tried to set the feet of other men; though not necessarily in the hope that war might be avoided, for the man of vision is always the truest realist and such a hope might well have failed to withstand his knowledge of humanity's immediate past. He was a "pacifist" and worked in "the peace-movement" rather in order that war might be fully known for what it is, and in order that this "peace-movement" should indeed be a movement, a creative thing moving in a new direction, whose fundamental values should be antithetical to those underlying war and those institutions of society which declare their essential nature in the phenomenon of war.

But while it is true to say that for most of his adult life (since a particular spiritual crisis resulting from his personal experience of the last war) Max Plowman was an avowed "pacifist," the idea of pacifism as negative war-resistance was abhorrent to him. Max Plowman was a pacifist for the same reason which made him a poet and the interpreter of Blake and Shakespeare; his visionary eye saw modern war as that ultimate manifestation of evil against which common humanity demanded that a stand should be made, the point at which the ordinary decent man, seeing this evil even with his short-sighted and unvisionary eyes, should turn from destructiveness towards some positive and creative purpose in life.

So that pacifism and all Max Plowman meant by it was quite other than a negation; it was a faith; he professed "the faith called pacifism" and gave one of his few books that title, and faith demands a positive activity on behalf of what it holds. For Max Plowman pacifism involved the revaluation of all aspects of human life and the living of life according to this revaluation. War, and a consequent pacifism, was the point at which his vision came to grips with the darkness in which a blind world found itself plunged.

It may seem that there is little evidence at present for the belief that Max Plowman was a great man whose gift of vision made him among others the eyes of his day, or for the belief that he will later be recognised as such. Comparatively few people have heard of him, comparatively few people read his books in his lifetime or knew him personally. But a few did know him personally, and on these the influence of his example has been profound; there lies the evidence for his immortality. For some of those who knew him will be concerned with the formation of Western thought and behaviour in the next few decades; they in turn will become the men of vision whose eyes society is now beginning even consciously to need; in what these men do Max Plowman will live. And if his immortality be anonymous, though this is unlikely, since he will be written of and spoken of and since there remains the small but potent body of his own work to which the public is already turning, it will be none the less real. If mankind is capable (and individuals at least have always been so capable) of making the necessary evolutionary leap which will bring its consciousness where Max Plowman's consciousness already was "before his time," then the fruit of his labour, and the true nature of his apparent failures, together with the rightness of his apparent neglect of the written word, will be manifest in the fulness of time. We do not lose a good man by his death; good, as well as evil, is like the heads of the hydra: where was one man of vision there shall be two.

R. H. WARD

NEGROES IN THE U. S. A.

President Roosevelt in his message to the Negro Aid Convention held in Chicago at the end of September underlined the international implications of the race problem in America. Very truly he declared :—

> Racial strife renders us suspect abroad. The integrity of our nation and our war aims is at stake in our attitude to minority groups at home. Men of all races, black, white, brown and yellow—fight beside us for freedom. We cannot stand before the world as champion of the oppressed peoples, unless we practise as well as preach the principles of democracy for all men.

Practice tests profession. Actions speak louder than words and the actions of white Americans in the mass have been for long conveying to Asia and to Africa a message that is far from reassuring.

"THE WHEEL OF THE LAW"
OR THE DHARMACAKRA

[**V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar** of the History Department of the University of Madras is a deep student of the ancient Indian Puranas. He is also the translator of the Tamil classic, the *Silappadikaram*, one of the works which support his thesis here of the fundamental agreement between the ancient Hindus, Buddhists and Jains.—ED.]

A study of Indian sculpture reveals the astonishing fact that except in rare cases, as at Sanchi and Bodhgaya, the Buddha is not represented in human form but only by symbols.[1] The symbol by which the Buddha's teaching (Dharma) is represented in early Buddhist sculpture is the cakra, more popularly known as Dharmacakra. This is commonly called in English the "Wheel of the Law." The other symbols usually associated with the Buddha are the Bodhi tree, the chatta or umbrella, and the paduka or the holy feet of the Lord. We are not concerned with these symbols here. Suffice it to say, as has been well said by that talented historian of India E. B. Havell, that Buddhist symbolism reflects largely the spirit of Vedic idealism.

Among the representations symbolical of the Buddha's words and deeds, the Dharmacakra stands pre-eminent. In the great stupa at Sanchi, two square pillars surmounted by capitals adorn each gateway. Images of men and women, of animals like the lion and the elephant, are to be seen between and above the architraves. Dominating them all stands the great wheel, flanked on either side by attendants and the emblem of the Trisula, also represented in later Buddhist art, *e. g.*, on the Ammaravati pillars of the Andhra period. This is the sacred prayer-wheel of the Buddhists. This wheel represents the first sermon which the Buddha gave after he got his Enlightenment. This sermon was a proclamation of the Buddhist dhamma. It was delivered for the first time to five monks at Isipatana near Benares. The sermon itself is called Dharmacakra pravartana sutra, as it constitutes the quintessence of the Buddhist religion.

If we subject it to a simple analysis, it behoves a person to avoid the two extreme paths—the paths of self-torture and of a thirst for the pleasures of life. But one should endeavour to follow the middle path, which is, in other words, the eightfold path. This consisted in "right faith, right aims, right speech, right action, right living, right endeavour, right thought and right meditation." A follower of this path would gradually get rid of the thirst

[1] *History of Indian and Indonesian Art*, by A. K. COOMARASWAMY, p. 31.

for ephemeral pleasures which lead one to eternal suffering. He would ultimately be led to live a life of moral purity. In short, to pursue the eightfold path is to get enlightened. If we dispassionately reflect for a moment on what constitutes the eightfold path, it is nothing more than the fundamental principles of the Hindu Sanatana Dharma. The real service which the Buddha did was to lay stress on them so that the world might shed all miseries and cultivate virtue.

The importance of this sacred wheel is seen from the several references to it in the canonical books of the Buddhists. In the *Suttanipata*,[1] for instance, we have the following :–

> Maya pavattitam cakkam
> Dhammacakkam anuttaram. (*Mahavagga* 557.)

In the *Anguttara-Nikaya* again[2] it is said

> Yada Buddho abhiññaya dhammacakkam pavattayi
> Sadevakassa lokassa sattha appatipuggalo. (*Cakkavagga* 33.3)[3]

As the first "turning of the wheel of the Law" was done by the Buddha one of the attributes given him is the Dharmacakrapravartanacharya. His first sermon is the first "turning." This is the construction placed by the Sarvastavadins who pin their faith to the eightfold path. To them dharmacakra stands for the destruction of passions.[4] But there is another school of Buddhism represented by the Mahasamghikas who take dharmacakra pravartana to mean all that the Buddha has said.

Though it is reasonable to assume that it must be a reference to a particular sermon or doctrine, and therefore to the first sermon which the Buddha gave at Benares, still the evidence of Tamil literature seems to be in favour of the views of the Mahasamghikas.

In that celebrated Sangam classic of the second century A. D., the *Manimekalai*, it is stated :—

> Arakkadir ali tirappada urutti (V. l. 76),

meaning turning the sacred wheel in different ways. In plain language it is a reference to the many-sided teachings of the Buddha. The scholiast makes the term *tirappada* refer to the various doctrines of the Buddhist faith. Twice in this Tamil epic the Buddha is given the attributes of Ādi mudalvan aravāḷiyālvon (VI. II : X. 61). Aravāḷi is the Tamil expression for dharmacakra, and uruṭṭinan for pravartana. Elsewhere in this classic occurs :—

> Dharumacakkira muruṭṭinan (X. l. 26)
> Aravali uruṭṭanam (XXIX. l. 27) cp. Virasoliyam, yappu.

Though aravāḷi is generally associated with the Buddhist tradition, still it is a common term for the Hindu and even the Jain faiths.

[1] Pali Text Society, London, 1913, p. 693.
[2] Pali Text Society, Vol. I.
[3] See also Bhayavagga 127.4 : Rajavagga (CXXXIII).
[4] *Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist School*, by J. MASUDA (1925), p. 19 n.

Hindu mythology is full of the wheel (cakra) sacred to Vishnu, and its origin is traced to the Sun God whose diurnal motion was symbolised by the wheel. The twelve months of the year and the twelve signs of the Zodiac represent the twelve spokes of the wheel.[1] The Cakra of Vishnu is called Sudarsana, literally "pleasing to look at." It is a symbol of dharma and consequently terrifying to the followers of adharma. Once unrighteousness enveloped the whole universe. When seers found it impossible to carry out the Vedic rites enjoined on them, they appealed to Hari who offered them his cakra, adding that if it were let loose on earth, it would go on revolving to a place where its spokes would fall apart. It rolled on until it reached the banks of the holy stream Drshadvati. Here its spokes (nemi) got scattered. Hence the place was named Naimisha. It was here the Creator continued to perform the sacrifices for thousands of years, and later the sages and kings performed *yajnas*, as it was universally recognised as the holy spot. The *Vayu Purana*, which records this tradition, mentions the very name dharmacakra twice in this connection (I. 183: II. 8), roughly assigned to the fifth century B. C.

What is specially interesting is that the reference of Tiruvalluvar to aravāḷi seems to fit in with the traditional cakra of Hari. Different interpretations are being given to this *kuralvenba* (I. 8). One is that it is a reference to the Jaina deity. In the age when the *Tirukkural* was composed sectarianism was absent from the Tamil land. Does not the *Silappadikaram* speak of God as the Buddhan, Aruhan and Sivan? And yet the modern student will seek a reference to the Jain doctrine here. We must at least respect the view of the celebrated Āḷvār who lived a thousand years ago and who has interpreted āḷi as āḷippaṭai and who finds in it an unimpeachable reference to the sacred wheel of the Tirumal.[2] The tradition is that Hari protects the world by the application of his Cakra against the unrighteous. This is why a king whose duty was to protect the state and society according to dharma got the title Cakravartin. This is confirmed by a statement in the *Jivakachintamani*:[3] "Āḷikkāvalarāvar kove (cakravarti)." Appropriately to this Ilango-Adigal speaks of King Karikala's unequalled universal sway.[4] The author of the *Rājarājacolanula* refers to the chariot wheel which ran over the son of Manunitikandacholan through the latter's order, as aravāḷi (1. 5). Again in the *Silappadikaram*, we are told that the Pandyas turned the wheel in the prescribed way (XV. ll. 1-2) and this can be well compared with what has been said of the Pandyas in the *Puram* (3.

[1] *The Spirit of Buddhism*, by H. Gour, pp. 521-32.
[2] Tiruvaymoli.
[3] Stanza 2843.
[4] *Silappadikaram*. 1. 68.

ll. 4-5)[1]. If we turn to the pages of the *Padirruppattu* we find the Chera monarchs using the dharmacakra. Imayavaramban Nedumceralatan rolled his golden wheel (tikiri) over the entire universe.[2] In the same way Palyanai-Selkelu Kuttuvan followed the path of the dharmacakra. It may be remembered that he performed a number of Vedic *yajnas* and cannot therefore have been either a Buddhist or a Jain.[3] The same attribute is given to another Chera ruler, Selvakkadungo Vāḷiyātan.[4] Thus it can be readily admitted that the Tamil kings of the Sangam period, whether Cholas, Pandyas or Cheras, turned the wheel of the dharma (aram) during their reigns. In other words, they pursued the Vedic path and ruled justly and well. The immortal Kamban, author of the Tamil *Ramayana*, had this in his mind when he addressed Dasaratha, the King of Ayodhya: "O King, all your ancestors attained name and fame by turning righteously the sacred wheel (nemi Paṇḍuruṭṭi)."[5] The conclusion is therefore irresistible that the concept of the Cakra in Hindu mythology afforded the basis for the pravartana of the Buddhist wheel of the Law.

Not only did the symbol serve the Buddhists, but also the idea was copied by the Jains. The latter attached equal importance to the dharmacakra. In support of this one has only to turn to the pages of the *Jivakachintamani* to meet with identical statements of the turning of āḷi or nemi which all mean the dharmacakra. The king is addressed as Ilangalāḷiyinān which Naccinarkiniyar interprets as Cakravartin.[6] Above all aravāḷiyannal meaning Aruhan occurs in this classic, an unmistakable testimony that the Jains adopted the dharmacakra also. One also finds evidence from Jaina art. In the temple at what is known as Jina Kanchi (a suburb of Conjeevaram) there is a figure of the cakra which can be well claimed by the Jains as the dharmacakra.

If the above brief survey of an interesting subject proves anything, it is that in fundamentals the ancient Hindus, Buddhists and Jains agreed, irrespective of the differences in the approach to realise their objects in life and life hereafter. There were toleration and mutual appreciation. The Buddhists and the Jains did not discard the beaten and hallowed track of their ancestors in the principles governing their faith. Theirs was more of a compromise than a disagreement.

V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR

[1] See also *Puram* 270, l. 3.
[2] Stanza 14, ll. 18-19.
[3] Stanza 22, l. 4.
[4] Stanza 69, l. 17.
[5] *Ayodhya, mantira.* 35.
[6] Stanza 32 : cp. Stanzas 744 and 2417.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE LIGHT OF HINDUISM

[**Dr. Muhammad Hafiz Syed** of the University of Allahabad presents a comparative study of Christianity and Hinduism—ED.]

Christianity, one of the greatest religions of the Semitic stock, claims to be the sole custodian of Truth. Its Supreme teacher, the only begotten son of God. The rest of the world, unless it acknowledges Christ as its saviour, is doomed to perdition. To speak of Christianity and Hinduism in the same breath is considered, in certain quarters, as nothing short of sacrilege. Hinduism, as misunderstood these days, is looked down upon as a pagan faith with no solid foundation and with idolatry as its basic principle. This, surely, is the verdict of unenlightened people who have never cared to study the tenets of any faiths comparatively.

Those who have taken the trouble of studying and understanding both these religions sympathetically and impartially, have come to the conclusion that both aim at purifying the human heart and ultimately leading man to the source of his being. Those who have some insight into the mysteries of religious life have come to believe that higher Hinduism, minus all its accretions and latter-day interpolations, is a universal religion that appeals to all shades of opinion and provides spiritual food for all types of men.

The more it is studied, the more does it illuminate the intellect and satisfy the heart.

A critical study of Christian theology reveals some teachings which need satisfactory explanation. Others present insuperable difficulties in fully grasping their underlying meaning and true significance. Let us take some of them one by one and see what light ancient Hinduism throws on some of the gaps that one finds in them and on the mysteries that underlie them :—

(1) The doctrine of original sin cannot be reconciled with the divine nature of man accepted and believed by almost all religions of the Aryan stock. In the Christian scriptures it is said that man was made after the image of God. How are these two seemingly contradictory teachings to be reconciled ?

Man in general, humanity as a whole, is born in sin, in sinful surroundings, with sinful desires. In other words, according to the teachings of higher Hinduism, the spirit (Jivatma) descends into the material forms and completely identifies itself with earthly vehicles. This descent into matter is called *Pravritti-mârga*, or the path of forthgoing. The characteristic of this period of man's life is sensual enjoyment, reckless plunging into all

kinds of pleasures, an undesirable kind of life in short. Till such time as he is tired out and finally satiated with earthly enjoyments he is under the full dominance of his passional nature and of wrong-doing. In a word, he leads a sinful life, in so far as he does not act in accordance with a moral standard and in harmony with Divine Law. He totally forgets sometimes his higher self and disregards moral sanctions.

But these vicious tendencies in him do not last for ever. There comes a time when he is awakened to a higher sense of values. From that moment onward he begins to turn spirit-ward; his evil ways are dropped one by one and he begins to tread what is called the path of return. This view of life explains the meaning of original sin. There is a deeper meaning also underlying this doctrine. In the words of Raman Maharshi,

> The sin is said to be in man; but there is no manhood in sleep; manhood comes on waking, along with the thought, "I am this body"; this thought is the real original sin; it must be removed by the death of the ego; after which this thought will not arise.

Further he explained the truth of Christian teaching in these convincing words:—

> The body is the cross; the ego is Jesus, the son of man; when he is crucified, he is resurrected as the "son of God," which is the glorious real self. One should lose the ego in order to live in the true sense of the word.

(2) "The kingdom of Heaven is within you." The word heaven stands for other-worldliness, peace, harmony and wisdom. These are not to be found in outer teachings of life. The ancient Indian sages have taught us in unequivocal words that there is no happiness for a man outside his own higher Self, the nature of which is bliss, *ânanda*, and that this reality dwells in the heart which is the seat of the Divine Self.

Christ believed with whole-hearted conviction in what he called the kingdom of God, and he meant by this something inward, spiritual, natural and eternal, something diametrically opposite to that messianic Kingdom to the advent of which his contemporaries looked forward—a kingdom which was conceived of as outward, visible and temporal.

According to Indian thought, the kingdom of God is already in our midst; and all that men need to do in order to hasten its advent is to realize its presence. The kingdom of God is, in the first place, the kingdom of soul life, the kingdom of the realized presence of God in the soul of man. It has no limits, either temporal or spatial. It is here, if anywhere. It is now, if it will ever be. We do not wait for its advent. It is in the midst of us. When we pray, as Christ taught us to pray, that it may "come," we are praying that we may realize, each of himself, its hidden presence.

Further, Indian sages have taught us that the kingdom of God is the kingdom of intrinsic reality. The final measure of reality belongs to

it, and to it alone. By reference to its hidden treasure all other ends, all other joys, are as shadows and dreams. When a man has found its pearl of great price, he will sell all that he has in order that he may acquire that inward prize.

The Kingdom of God is attained by the age-old method of Soul-growth. The law of growth is the master law of Nature's being, and therefore the master law of human life. To realize the divine potencies of one's nature, to become the God that one really is (though now in the germ), to earn the right to say, "I and my father are one."

It may be added that the kingdom is open to all men. The least and lowliest of us is a ray of the divine light. The chosen people is not Israel but Humanity. God is their All-Father, "the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." In the illimitable inward kingdom, there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free; for God "is all and in all." Do we not know that most of the sages and saints of India have proclaimed in no uncertain language that God is the ideal Self of man because He is the ideal end? It follows from these premises that the duty of man is to find his higher self, to grow towards the spiritual perfection of which his nature is capable.

(3) The Self in a sense is All in All. It is spoken of in the Upanishads as the Totality, of which the worlds and the creatures are fractions, though in absolute truth it has no fractions. Thus to gain the Self is to gain the All. The sacred lore of the Hindus tells us: "That which is infinite is Happiness; in the finite there is no happiness." We are taught that the Self alone is great; all else is infinitesimally small. This view of spiritual values makes the famous enigmatical saying of Jesus Christ as clear as daylight. "What doth it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" For a very small price—the surrender of the ego—this infinitely great Self is to be had. But this small price has to be paid.

(4) Another precept of Jesus which remains as a "hard saying" to his followers is: "Be ye therefore perfect even as your father which is in heaven is perfect." The ordinary Christian, full of ordinary frailties and weaknesses, asks how he can become perfect as God is perfect. Seeing the impossibility of the achievement set before him, he quietly puts it aside, and thinks no more about it. But seeing it as the crowning effort of *many lives* of steady improvement it comes within calculable distance of our achievement and these precious words yield meaning beyond our limited vision and hope. This view of gradual development and unfoldment is not generally accepted by the Christian divines.

Light, once again, comes from the Indian sages who point to this path of final perfection in clear and unmistakable language. They rightly

believe in the gradual evolution of man's mental and moral faculties. The highest aim of a Hindu neophyte is to become perfect in due course of time by gaining experience in every walk of life, through sorrow, suffering and moral struggle which finally lead him on to the goal of perfection. Christ's words seem to be more in keeping with the age-old teaching of the ancient Rishis than with the interpretation of the Christian divines.

(5) "Love thy neighbour as thyself; love those who hate you; bless those who curse you." The question that at once arises is why one should love one's neighbour as one's own self when the neighbour refuses to recognise his oneness with oneself. The Indian sages have taught us that the higher Self of man is an indivisible unity. This common life is shared by all, good or bad, rich or poor, high or low, saint or sinner. Therefore an injury done to my neighbour is an injury done to me. Similarly to love him is to love my own self. There is no other self than my own Self. Hence this consistent and logical injunction to love others as one should love one's own self. Further, to meet life with unwavering trust is to take for granted that light, not darkness, is the heart of nature; and to believe in that light is to love it and to love it is to love all things for its sake. In the Christlike life there is, in the last resort, but one motive for action, love.

Sweeping aside as frivolous and inquisitorial the ever-increasing multitude of rules which complicated the life and burdened the conscience of the zealous Jew, Christ gave instead two cardinal commandments which are essentially one:—

> Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength....Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

In these words the doom of the old dispensation is pronounced, and the gates of the kingdom of Heaven —the kingdom of freedom and love —are thrown open to all. The only way in which we can interpret our realization of unity in the world of the relative is through love for all creatures; just as any kind of hurtful action is a denial of the Reality in which all are one, so are self-sacrifice, love for all that lives and service of our fellow-men the expressions in the world of relativity of that Supreme Reality which can never be fully expressed here, the utter unity of all that is.

(6) *The Holy Trinity.* One of the basic doctrines of Christianity is belief in the Divine Triad. To a non-Christian it may appear confusing but its underlying meaning is clear. According to ancient Hindu thought the manifested God, the One, appears as three. Among the Hindus the philosophers speak of the manifested Brahman as Sat-Chit-Ananda, Existence, Intelligence and Bliss. Popularly God is a Trinity; Shiva, the Beginning and the End; Vishnu, the Preserver; Brahma, the

Creator of the Universe.

(7) Now let us take three famous verses from the Sermon on the Mount :—

Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.

To whom does this apply ? Can an average man act up to this high ideal ? Obviously it is the teaching for a man becoming perfect, but for the man of the world it is impracticable. Christianity has not made this distinction ; but it actually practises the distinction although it does not realize it theoretically. *The effect of recognising a thing that we do not practise is to demoralise us* and not to raise us. If we pretend that it is our theory of life that, when a thing is stolen from us, we give the thief something more, then if we do not practise it, we are surely hypocrites and hypocrisy is one of the worst vices.

True practice and theory makes life in all parts sacred, not secular. On Sunday the Christian goes to Church and admires the Sermon on the Mount. On Monday he goes to his office and orders the prosecution of his cheating neighbour. The one life is sacred ; the other is secular, profane. Hinduism permeates the whole life with religion, and there is no part of the life of the Hindu which cannot form part of his faith. From this explanation we are led to believe that this teaching, lofty as it is, cannot possibly be followed by the ordinary run of humanity. That is why it is disregarded as something visionary and beyond the moral capacities of an average man. When it is viewed in the light of ancient Hindu teaching its infeasibility loses its force and it appears to be sound and sensible in its underlying significance.

The ancient Hindus have never believed in absolute morality. The relativity of the Hindu ideal of *dharma* is acknowledged by the contending schools of Indian philosophy. The Hindus do not look upon all mankind as on the same level of thought and morality. There are different gradations of men. Therefore the moral or spiritual laws guiding man's destiny must necessarily be different at different stages. What is right for a babe cannot be right for a boy. Similarly what is right for an undeveloped soul cannot be right for a morally awakened man.

This teaching is meant for an advanced soul who has no interest in earthly joys and has renounced them joyfully as he has found something higher and more valuable than what he had. Such beings are called *Sanyasis*.

MUHAMMAD HAFIZ SYED

TRUTH

[**V. Subrahmanya Iyer** contributed a thought-provoking study to our January 1942 issue on "Philosophy As Such in India: A Misapprehension." Here the eminent Sanskrit scholar distinguishes the many types of truths from the common feature of them all, the "Truth of Truth."—ED.]

I

In making an attempt to write on a subject like "Truth," to which the thoughtful minds of all times have turned serious attention, one cannot but seek, wherever possible, the benefit of the light that such minds can throw upon one's path of enquiry. Some of them observe:—

"The most striking contradiction of our civilization—the fundamental reverence for Truth which we all profess and the thoroughgoing disregard for it which we practise." (Stephanson). "The world is naturally averse to all the Truth it sees or hears, but swallows nonsense and lie with greediness and gluttony." (Butler). "Truth has no hold on mankind." (Anatole France).

Nevertheless, the world seems to be as full of life as ever. And if man could get on without troubling himself about Truth, why should we think seriously at all about it now? Let us turn again to the past for a moment.

"Truth is the greatest thing that man may keep." (Chaucer). "There is one road to peace and that is Truth." (Shelley). "Truth is the foundation of all knowledge and the cement of all societies." (Dryden). "Truth is the most powerful thing in the world, since even fiction must be governed by it." (Shaftesbury). "There is no alleviation for the sufferings of mankind except veracity of thought and action." (Huxley). "Truth is the summit of being." (Emerson). "That enthusiasm for Truth, that fanaticism for veracity, which is a greater possession than much learning, is a nobler gift than the power of increasing knowledge." (Bacon). "United by the bond of Truth flourishes Society." (Zoroaster). "Truth is that which alone makes it possible for the world in which we now live, to free itself from all sorrows." (*Mahabharata*). "Truth alone triumphs (at the end). Through Truth lies the path to the divine." (Upanishad).

If Truth be so very valuable, why do not all men try to get at it?

"Every man seeks for Truth but God alone knows who has found it." (Chesterfield). "Truth like a bird ever poised for a flight at man's approach." (Brown). "Truth is always in a well." (Democritus).

Is it not then tantalizing that one cannot give up or ignore Truth and yet cannot get at it? It is not meant that one cannot utter untruth. But even when one speaks falsehood, one is conscious of something that is true. The notion or instinct of Truth is said to be there, all the same.

"Truth is only the ever receding and yet *ever impelling* final goal of life in each of its myriad forms." (Aliotta). "Truth is within ourselves; it takes no

rise from outward things whatever you may believe. There is an inmost centre in us all where Truth abides in fullness." (Browning).

What then is Truth ? The question is as old as Pontius Pilate, and similar questions had been asked during thousands of years. Nevertheless, it does not appear to have been answered satisfactorily. Such being the nature of Truth, some have held that man values many things, of which Truth is one. Other "values," as they say, such as those of goodness or beauty, are not inferior to "Truth value" in bringing satisfaction to man. But everyone appears to understand Truth perhaps in the sense of truthfulness or sincerity. No doubt, sincerity is fundamental in gaining a knowledge of Truth. Those, however, that have a wider knowledge of the world have noticed a myriad of other implications of it. A mathematical truth, for instance, such as that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles cannot be brought under the same head as the historical truth that Columbus discovered America. Similarly, there are religious, yogic, mystical, theological, scholastic, legal, sociological, ethical, æsthetical, scientific, metaphysical or speculative and many other kinds of truths. And these have varieties and degrees according to their several stand-points. All of them are sometimes treated as "philosophical" in the West. As Paulsen, Faraday and others say, "Truth should be his (the philosopher's) *primary* object." But philosophical truths are seen to vary endlessly even in the West, in spite of the Cartesian definition based on the concepts of "Clearness and distinctness." This diversity has forced some to make further enquiry, which has resulted in such classifications as Epistemological and Intellectual, Absolute and Relative, Empirical, Pragmatic and Ultimate and so forth.

"It is a maxim accepted among philosophers themselves that '*Philosophy* ceases, when *Truth* is acknowledged.'" (Bulver). "There will be no truth entirely true. Our judgment in a word can never reach as far as perfect Truth. Truth is always relative and imperfect." (Bradley).

Having realized this difficulty, some modern Western thinkers sought to use the words "validity" and "certainty" to explain *truth*, as though they were clearer. But even these have been found to be not less difficult to define and have been characterised as "nebulous" by some authorities. Having thus formed some idea of the *nature* of the subject, some great thinkers have rightly directed their attention to the *meaning* of the term. For, even when men say that *Truth* is "unknowable" or "unknown," Truth must have a meaning to those that say so. Various interpretations have been tried, such as "Copy," "Correspondence," "Coherence," "Consistency," or "Harmony," "Inconceivability of the opposite" and "Pragmatism," the most attractive not only in the West but also in the East. Many have attempted

to distinguish between *Truth* and *Reality* and to ascertain their relation. Modern thinkers like Bradley, Joachim, MacKenzie and others have referred to many solutions. " There is no finality in this matter," as Wildon Carr, no mean authority, has said.

All the same, there seems to be no man that does not feel that he possesses some sense of Truth. The most common or familiar significance is, as Leuba would have it, " Truth is what agrees with what I *like* or what disagrees with what I dislike." But a moment's reflection shows how *every day* new religious and mystical creeds or cults are springing up, each claiming to know the highest Truth and discarding or condemning others. The case is not different with "theologies," with " scholasticisms " and, to a certain extent, even with scientific theories. And it is more staggering in the case of the numberless metaphysical " isms " spun out of one's own brain. It is said that there are as many Truths in philosophy as there are human beings.

The result is the rapid succession of wars involving more and more human beings all the world over in greater and greater suffering. For it is the views in regard to Truth that the *leaders* of men take which determine their sense of *right* or *wrong*, that are the root causes of their own actions as well as of the actions of the bodies of less thoughtful men that follow them.

Wars and sufferings are forcing us to seek remedies. Nevertheless men *will not* think of Truth, though it is repeatedly declared to be the most effective; for such thinking is often most exacting, nay, most tedious and puzzling. But

" Without seeking, truth cannot be known at all. It can neither be declared from the pulpit, nor set down in articles nor in any wise prepared and sold in packages for use. Truth must be ground for every man by himself out of its husk with such help as he can get indeed but not without stern labour of his own." (Ruskin). "Seven years of silent enquiry are needful for a man to learn the truth but fourteen in order to learn to make it clearly known to his fellowmen." (Plato). "No man can learn what he has not the preparation for learning, however near to his eyes the object. An alchemist may tell his precious secrets to a carpenter and he shall never be the wiser —the secrets he would not utter to a chemist for an estate." (Emerson).

India, which has dived deepest into this subject, points out that even

" one hundred and twenty years of thought are not enough to know how far one still is from pure and unqualified Truth." (Upanishad). " One has to be born again and again (several times) to realise the highest truth (knowledge)." (*Gita*)

When the pursuit of Truth is so difficult it is nothing strange that Bradley should say, " Love of Truth pulls one way and love of mental ease another."

The effect of life's turmoils and its keen disappointments depresses ordinary minds so much as to make

them seek refuge in their uppermost *emotions*. But more noteworthy is the effect produced even on thoughtful and intellectual minds, like those of scientists and metaphysicians. Such men often seek their final refuge in *mystic* ecstasies, visions or intuitions or feelings. This has been indicated beautifully by Thomson in the words, "Baulked *struggle*, strained *emotion*, baffled *enquiry*" make men seek their highest satisfaction in the truths of religion or mysticism. Even Jeans, Eddington, Bergson, and others have not been able to resist the lure of this "escape mechanism."

Every man thinks that what he knows or feels or likes is the "Truth." When men criticise each other, one does not know what Truth means for the other. The result of this attitude is, "A *truth* that one does not understand becomes an error." (Desbarolle). "Nothing is so easy as to deceive oneself; for what we wish that we readily believe." (Demosthenes).

And, as Karl Marx has said, it is such truths that have led us into the vortex of wars which have affected the whole of mankind at present. It is such experience in the past that made the *ancient* Hindus exclaim that the *peace and good of humanity at large* come about only when the *rulers* or *leaders* pursue Truth with undeviating steadfastness, *i. e.*, when they are real "philosophers," as Socrates and Plato later on observed. All the same, our wars and our sorrows are our best education. "Adversity is the first path to Truth," says Byron.

II

The unique characteristic of Ancient India's effort in this field is the fact that her seekers after Truth *persevered* till they ascertained the *final* meaning of that term. Here it was first realized that one's view of truth varies with one's tastes, tendencies and capacity. So they would not stop till they reached the goal. This truth, to put it briefly, is the common feature of *all* truths or the Ultimate Truth which the Hindus call the "Truth of Truths" (*Satyasya Satyam*). Nothing else specially distinguishes the essence of Indian culture from that of the other cultures of mankind. The Upanishad says that "Truth is what remains the same for ever." Most near it are Shakespeare's words: "Truth is Truth to the end of reckoning." Such Truth must be attained in this world (*Ihaiva*)—not after death. When it is broad daylight, does any one, *unless blind*, say that all is darkness and that nothing can be seen? Similar is the *Universal* character of the Truth sought by the Hindu, a feature to which deep modern thinkers like Viscount Samuel rightly refer. Even Napoleon Bonaparte is said to have laid emphasis on this aspect of Truth. The steps in its pursuit may be briefly indicated thus:—

(1) The basic or foremost step is that of distinguishing the several truths that bring satisfaction or comfort to *individuals* from the

Truth that leads to the well-being of all, *universally* and that *openly*. "Truth loves open dealing," as Shakespeare also would have it. Faiths, intuitions, ecstasies, visions, intellectual *interpretations* and *theories* have undoubtedly their value. They are indispensable at certain stages of mental development. They are internal, private, personal or compartmental aspects of Truth. And they naturally evoke rivalry. Nothing is more patent in life than that they are seen to multiply like blackberries and that they have led to never-ending differences and discords. So, the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* points out that we must *first* rid ourselves of the attitude "I know, I know" (or I am satisfied) and must base Truth upon *universality*. The idea of *individual* (internal) satisfaction develops a spirit similar to that of men engaged in sports or games. Yet, if it does not make one strive for higher stages, it will be a serious obstacle to the pursuit of pure Truth as such. The danger lies in the individual's ignoring the universal or the general, from which pure Truth is inseparable.

(2) It is not enough, the Indian thinkers of the past say, to study Truth either objectively or subjectively. It has to be investigated from the objective (*Kshetra*) as well as the subjective (*Kshetrajna*) stand-points. Scientific, logical, metaphysical and speculative aspects have all to be co-ordinated and balanced. To India belongs the credit of having carried these to human perfection. In Epistemology, it has not stopped till it determined the meaning of Awareness (*Drik*) and that of which it is aware (*Drisya*), internally and externally. The different disciplines of "*Yoga*" particularly *after* "scholastic" enquiry (*Panditya m*) leads onto this path. But the most serious drawback of *modern* mystics and metaphysicians or pandits is that they believe that knowledge, personal and individual, reveals everything about our *entire* universe. This should be carefully guarded against. *Kshetra Vicharam* or scientific enquiry into *objective* truth, including, for instance, such investigation as that of the "causal relation," just known to Europe and America, is *indispensable*. All the different truths are but steps leading to *Truth universal* as such. Further, owing to the fact that Truth final or Ultimate Truth is beyond all differences and distinctions, it is *identical* with Ultimate Reality. Truth as one's *thought* about Reality or Existence and different from it is a distinction made only at the lower or preliminary stages of enquiry.

(3) This combined and all-round enquiry seeks that knowledge of Truth that comprehends *all* knowledge (*Sarva Vidya*) so that there may be no possibility of *any* doubt (*sandeha*) arising or of any other view opposed (*virodha*) to it being advanced. *Only in India* and *nowhere else in the world* does it appear to have been at any time insisted that the *totality* of human *experience* (or knowledge including the errors, as Hegel would have it) should be kept in view to get at Truth-final. Europe and America have, for instance, as yet no conception of the co-ordination of the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep (*Avasthatraya*) which totality is basic for Indian enquiry. And it is *proved* that "Everything is upheld by

Truth and everything rests upon Truth." (*Mahabharata*)

Further, Europe and America have the conception of "the greatest happiness of the largest number." But in India the ideal is the "perfect happiness of all," which depends solely upon the knowledge of Truth.

The most important discipline of the mind in seeking Truth is an item well-known to Western scientists. But they have not the strength of mind or the will to pursue it to the end. This is known as "Depersonalization" or "Self-elimination." The scientists admit it so far as the objective world is concerned. The psychologist also adopts it *partly* in studying mental phenomena. But they know not what it is to root out or kill outright the "ego" or "self" (*Ahankara*) called the "black serpent" (*Krishnahi*). Hence they have no idea of the attainment of *ultimate, pure* or *perfect* Truth or Truth *universal*. Strictly speaking, no affirmative term or language can indicate it, so long as the "I," whether one is conscious or not of its existence, is there.

But in India, to the earnest *lover* of Truth, there can be no resting till the goal is reached. It may amuse the Western reader to see that among the disciplines prescribed, one is systematic prostration before asses and dogs till one wipes out one's egoism. One can be a religionist, a theologian, a scholastic, a scientist (partly), a metaphysician and a mystic above all, without the least thought of defining Truth. But one *cannot* be a "philosopher" in India (*Tatwa vid*) unless and until one becomes aware of and himself answers the question "How do I know that what I 'know' or 'feel' or 'intuit' is Truth?", which one cannot do until one's reason (Buddhi) becomes as sharp as the edge of a razor (*Kshurika Dhāra*).

Lastly, what Truth is cannot be made clear to one that has not the preparation necessary as above indicated. It takes, as Plato has said, at least seven years to grasp it, though not to master it even as he understood it. Those that have neither the mental strength nor the patience and perseverance to climb up this steep hill of Truth, must seek only their individual or *personal* satisfactions and delude themselves into the belief that what they know or feel *internally* is the Ultimate or pure Truth. Such satisfactions naturally are not free from the poison of the "black serpent" or *self-seekingness*. They may lead them *privately* or *individually* to the joys (here or elsewhere) that their "authorities," scriptural or personal, have assured them. But how do we know that what the authorities say is Truth?

"Children in years as well as children in knowledge have always been predisposed to the belief in the supernatural." (Vivian Phelps).

What a significant coincidence here! Indian philosophers also call men lacking in intelligence or knowledge "Balisa" (children). It is impossible to convince such human beings.

"Whoso speaketh the Truth to the unprepared is a liar in his own despite." India's highest ambition is that

"even God should be known, not according to the various beliefs of men but as He is in Truth (*Tatwatah*)." (Sri Krishna). "O! Almighty! take everything away from me, even Thyself, if thou so wishest, but, pray, leave unto me only Truth." (Sri Ramakrishna).

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

INDIAN WRITERS IN ENGLISH *

This little volume is a welcome addition to the excellent series of P. E. N. Books on the Indian Literatures, and its present reviewer, at least, has heard of a number of the writers mentioned for the first time. The title "Indo-Anglian" is cumbersome, to say the least. One wishes that the author's suggested "Indo-English" had replaced it. He has not used "Indo-English" because he says "Indo-Anglian" is more widely used. But it is doubtful if this term is well-established, and it is perhaps not too late to replace it with a clearer and more euphonious one.

To any one having a knowledge of English literature by Indian writers it is clear that it is much easier to write of the past than of the present; not for the obvious reason that the present is too much with us, but because there has been a clear declension in quality of production during the past fifty years. The critic is tempted to cry out "Where are the Dutts of yesteryear?" for it is that remarkable family, as the author of this book has clearly brought out, which was more responsible than any other for the great heights that have been attained by Indo-English writers. Tagore and Aurobindo Ghose, as well as Sarojini Naidu and the lesser lights all followed in the trail blazed by Toru Dutt, her sister and her cousins. Indeed it is doubtful if any Indian writer in English has attained to the extraordinary pure stream of poetry and prose that fragile Toru produced, though the range and power of the most famous of her successors may have been greater.

Present-day writers, though they tried their hands at a greater variety of subject-matter and forms of expression do not, on the whole, seem to realize that the art of the writer, like that of any other artist, requires years of apprenticeship and training; all the more so if the medium is not one's native language. Professor Iyengar points to a similar weakness in current writers. No doubt the chief reason in the weakening of such writing is the disillusionment of the younger generation with things Western, a disillusionment by no means always justified. Perhaps when the next stage of seeking is attained there will be a greater sense of balance in both thought and form which may lead to a renascence of Indo-English literature, which, as the author points out, would seem to have a real future, in spite of the current move towards greater use of the mother-tongue. In this respect India is unique and cannot be compared with other countries. India is a strange combination of *multa in uno*, so that she is at once both one country and many countries, from the cultural point of view. This gives her an opportunity of being more international than any other country, with the possible exception of Russia. The present *de facto* international

* *Indo-Anglian Literature.* By K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar. (Published for the P. E. N. All India Centre by the International Book House, Ltd., Ash Lane, Fort, Bombay. Re. 1/8.)

language is English, and it is likely to remain so for a long time to come. Through India's intimate contact with English life and thought English has come to be no longer a foreign language for a large section of her educated population. It is thus perfectly natural for it to be used as a means of literary expression, even as St. Paul used Greek, or the eleventh-thirteenth century Englishman, Norman French. It can never take the place of literature in the Indian languages, but it can act as a creative spring and a cultural bridge and binding force, both as between the Indian languages and India and the world.

The latter portion of Professor Iyengar's book tends inevitably to contain just a series of names, sometimes without sufficient discrimination. One can understand this difficulty, for there are at present so many Indo-English writers of ordinary merit; so one has to include all or exclude all of them. But none-the-less such a catalogue has considerable practical usefulness.

The war has given a considerable impetus to the publication of English books in India. Perhaps it will result in the breaking of the fetish that no book published by an Indian publisher is of value. If it does, it will mean a great contribution to the development of Indo-English, or "Indo-Anglian" literature. If the Indian novelist, essay-writer or biographer knew he would not have great difficulty in getting his work published, and if he also knew that he would be able to secure satisfactory remuneration, then there is little doubt that the amount of good literature produced would increase enormously. When even leading journals fail to remunerate writers regularly or adequately it is difficult to expect young writers to devote serious attention to the production of good literature, especially if one also considers the difficulty of finding employment, in peace time.

The book is supplied with an excellent "Suggested Reading List," which should be a help to many prospective readers. A second edition might also contain an index, which would add greatly to the usefulness of this valuable publication.

BANNING RICHARDSON

NEEDED: A LIVING FAITH *

The opposition of Religion and Science, as representing incompatible ways of thought, has been an obsession of the Christian Churches since the early days of the seventeenth century. In those days it represented a challenge to the supreme authority, made by a very small body of intelligent men who claimed the right to investigate the laws of nature. The inherent antagonism was that between faith and inductive reason, between the age-old premises of religious beliefs, and those that were being gradually built up by the study of material phenomena through the accumulation of a long series of patient observations. It is only, however, within the last hundred years that Science has been in a position to outline a cosmology that

* *Science, Religion and the Future.* By C. E. RAVEN. (Cambridge University Press, London. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

might, though rather feebly and unconvincingly, be conceived as banishing Spirit from the universe, the suggestion, at least, that "natural law" could ultimately account for the amazing diversities of the presentational world, without the necessity for postulating any external directing power, including even Bergson's *élan vital.*

Dr. C. E. Raven, in the series of lectures now published in book form under the title "Science, Religion and the Future," has spent the greater part of his space in tracing the genesis and evolution of this gradual development of thought, a task for which he is admirably qualified by his wide reading, more particularly on the biological side. His ostensible purpose is to find a way of conciliation, and he makes a propitiatory concession in his second chapter when he writes :—

> Christendom is still and apparently contentedly wedded to a system of thought and to some extent also, of ethics and organisation which is pre-scientific, indeed almost mediæval. It has not yet completed its move out of the habitation constructed for it in the thirteenth century.

The essence of his suggested remedy is to adapt the scientific method to religion, to instigate deeper research into the historical sources of the life of Jesus. And he concludes with the statement :—

> The hour is coming when we shall invigorate theology by recovering the Alexandrine doctrine of Christ as the Word of God, as being not merely the Saviour of men, but the Redeemer of the whole creation which has been created through him.

Now before positing that there can be no way out of the conflict by the means here advocated, it will be advisable to consider briefly the real nature of the opposition under consideration. It obviously does not lie between the leaders of Religious and Scientific thought. The practising scientist is not, or should not be, concerned with any form of religious propaganda. As many eminent scientists have emphatically declared, science deals with secondary and not prime causes, with investigation into the laws that appear to govern material complexes, organic and inorganic. Science, in fact, works within a closed circle and is limited to the observation of physical phenomena as reported by the evidence of the five senses. It is no concern of the true scientist either to oppose or to uphold any religious belief. The trouble arises, however, with the influence of "popular" science upon the plain man who has found in it an excuse to abandon the religious exercises in which he never truly believed. There can be no denying that that influence has played a very important part in bringing about the horrible conditions in which we are now living, has been a dominant factor in leading us down into the darkness of the chaos of civilisation at the present time.

It is indeed to the mass of the people that our arguments are directed, but can we ever hope to persuade them back to a religious faith by patching up the grounds for belief in a disunited Christian church ? Young Russia, young Germany and a certain proportion of young England and America, would receive such reasoning as can be brought to bear upon them, either with strongly prejudiced minds or with indifference, even if they could be induced to listen. And why, after all, should they believe that Christianity which has failed after nearly two thousand years of trial, could be so reinvigorated as to succeed now ?

No, the only hope for the world is to be found in the revival of a living faith, but it cannot be faith in any particular sect. Jesus was not the only great teacher. There were others before him, and we believe that another will follow. They have all, including Plato, said very much the same things, most prominently the need for Universal Brotherhood, for justice, righteousness and love. But the essence of it all, the essence so largely nullified by the doctrine of vicarious sacrifice, is that every man is responsible for his own salvation, that only by perpetual individual effort can he ever find release from that wheel of matter which is the boundary of the natural sciences.

J. D. BERESFORD

THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM *

Since from one-fifth to a quarter of the world's population is Muslim, Islam is one of the most important spiritual influences. The conception of Muslim unity, which has had a gradually increasing effect upon international politics during the present century is, the editors say, the chief reason for this survey of the principal areas in which Islam predominates.

Each chapter of *Islam Today* is written by an authority on the special district dealt with, and sets out to answer such questions as the extent to which Islam is still governed by its Faith, the effect of Western influence upon its culture, its attitude to the war, and its aspirations.

The largest Muslim communities are in North Africa and Western and Middle Asia. Communities varying in size are also found in different European countries. There are twenty-five million Muslims in China and there are other communities in Asia not separately dealt with. Turkey being officially non-Muslim is not included. Although many Islamic peoples have identified themselves with the cultural life of the countries of their adoption, there remain more than a dozen Muslim countries whose chief inspiration comes from Islam, which, to borrow the words used by Mr. Yusuf Ali in an address to the "Society for the Study of Religions," is "not only a religion as understood in Europe, but a way of life that affects all departments of thought and action."

Meleager, a Syrian scholar, tells us that in Syria the Arabo-Islamic world comes into closest touch with the West in all spheres of life. Many Syrians go to European universities, and there are many Western and American centres of education in Syria. Thus Western customs and ideas have become grafted from without upon a stock which for centuries has been based on the teachings of the Quran, Hellenistic philosophy and an intellectual rather than an active way of life. The Arabs are consequently torn between the opposites of their tradition and the modern world of Western activity. To understand the spiritual confusion arising out of such a conflict of values it is essential to be able to appreciate the cultural nature of Islam, which follows, *ipso facto*, from its

**Islam Today*. Edited by A. J. ARBERRY and ROM LANDAU. (Faber and Faber, Ltd., London. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

religious code and includes principles for its social and political life. The problem is the problem of East and West—of thought and of action, the solution of which seems to lie in adjustment and the recognition of the proper valuation of each for co-operative employment in the field of human betterment.

It is the universal tendency of Islam, the outcome, perhaps, of its intellectual quality, to produce the spirit of tolerance for which it is noted. Such a spirit makes assimilation of new ideas comparatively easy and enriches itself thereby.

Dr. Taha Hussein, indeed, writes that the most significant trait of Egyptian culture is "its tempered fusion with other cultures." Egypt has added to the Islamic Arab legacy, "what she has drawn from the different European cultures." The Muslim world finds a strong tie in Arabic and its extensive literature, the acquisition of which, Miss Lambton says in her chapter on Persia, was the ambition of every man of learning. Since philosophy, art and learning, and all that these represent as a way of life originating in a common source of inspiration, form the root and are the very essence of Islamic aspiration, a common inherent bond unites Muslims the world over. "A Muslim from India," said Mr. Yusuf Ali, speaking of Islamic unity, "finds no difficulty in making himself at home among the Muslims in Arabia, Egypt, or China."

Mr. William Hichens, the author of numerous works on Swahili Muslim literature, speaks of an indefinable quality called "*heshima*," which may perhaps be defined as "Wisdom" with its characteristics and qualities, as an outstanding feature of the East African Arab.

> For the East African Muslim, his religion is the vital energy of his daily life, and in his every need, he turns to prayer for guidance and aid.

Each chapter consists of a historical summary of the country under consideration and leads up gradually to existing conditions. By this method of treatment, it is easy for readers to follow divergencies in type and, while tracing development, to note the uniting principle inherent in Islamic culture. In effect, these pages reveal a distinctive tendency towards a definite kind of culture and expression which, even in cases where there is departure from the original type, has continued to manifest itself.

Thus Mr. Hillelson, writing on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, says

> Islam has, within its essential unity of doctrine and ritual, permitted the growth of a variety of local forms, which bear imprint of the earlier cultures it has displaced.... There is no doubt that the Arab tribes have absorbed in varying degrees, the remnants of the populations, who occupied the country before the coming of the Arabs.

From these chapters will be apparent the importance attached to learning and education in the best sense of the word, and to the establishment of centres of culture in which all branches of learning could be acquired, and which preserve the essential quality and type of Islamic aspiration.

Dr. Taha Hussein, writing on Egypt, speaks of its historic function as that of giving refuge to foreign culture and, after assimilating it, moulding it into a new form suited to the Oriental temperament. Islamic culture is thus enriched by the assimilation of Western culture. This is made possible

by Islam's traditional practice of tolerance.

Mr. William Hichens notes the value of Islamic tolerance in East Africa and says that it has enabled Muslim and other communities to live amicably together despite sectarian differences. Sir Hassan Suhrawardy points to the same characteristic in India and attributes it to broad thinking derived from Ancient Indian and Hellenistic philosophies.

Miss Lambton, writing on the "Spiritual Influence of Islam in Persia," says that in spite of the tendency of modern nationalists to fall back upon the ancient culture of Persia, the civilization is essentially Islamic, however much modified by Persian genius.

The democratic spirit of Islam makes it naturally sympathetic to the Allied cause in the present struggle. In the U. S. S. R. a Muslim manifesto was issued, calling upon all Muslims to support the Red Army. Mr. Hillelson, speaking of the Fascist threat, says that it convinced the Sudanese Arabs that politically they "stand or fall by the democratic way of life, which is rooted in their religion and congenial to their social and political aspirations." Sir Arthur Wauchope, former High Commissioner of Palestine, writes in similar vein. Speaking of the reactions of Arabs and Jews, he says that the threat of German forces coming to the Holy Land only served to unite both peoples to resist what would be fatal to their liberties.

This volume has the advantage of being complete with bibliography and biographical notes.

L. E. PARKER

INDIA*

What must, I suppose, sustain combatant and non-combatant alike in this war is the assurance that it will be followed by a completely New Order in the affairs of mankind. This is at least true of those who are citizens or subjects of the United Nations and of those on their side.

Now we in India, while sharing in these common anxieties and hopes and plans, are at the same time overwhelmed by the serious constitutional problem that threatens the progress of this country. In the circumstances many of those who would otherwise be actively criticising or helping to mould the shape of things to come are indifferent, neutral or resigned. A few, however, have fought off that kind of defeatism and isolationism and are taking a lively interest in the events that are taking place around us today. It is to this gallant band that the author of *Independent India and a New World Order* belongs.

He examines the various Plans, those of Governments like Soviet Russia and England and the U. S. A. as well as the Plans set forth by publicists like H. G. Wells, Sir William Beveridge, Mr. Clarence Streit and others. In the end he finds them all inadequate.

**Independent India and a New World Order.* By Y. G. KRISHNAMURTI. (The Popular Book Depot, Lamington Road, Bombay. Rs. 10/-)

Friend of Friend. By COLIN GARBETT, (Oxford University Press, India Branch, Bombay. Rs. 5/-)

The Atlantic Charter is vague and some of its points are inconsistent with others. And some of its outworn phrases are taken from the nineteenth century political lexicon.

Of the proposed or existing Orders, that of Russia, both in its economic and social reconstruction, seems to receive the author's most sympathetic consideration. One might even say whole-hearted admiration, but there are certain contradictions which make it difficult to judge whether the author would have India follow the Russian plan or not. For example, he says,

Only under a system of Common Ownership the total productive power of the nation can be harnessed to the total needs.

Again,

It lies beyond the scope of our monograph to refute all the misconceptions and perversions of the socialist ideology. The Russian experiment even in its present phase contains the germ, later to grow luxuriantly, of a purely socialistic and federal construction of the people.

One is led to believe that the author does not wish merely to reproduce the better known facts about Russia (such as equality of the sexes, universal franchise, etc.) but does so in order to hold them up for admiration if not emulation. But his conclusion is that neither Christianity nor communism can "offer to the world a universal principle which supersedes war." Communism: because it

treats the individual not as man but as subject material, and makes of society not a living organism but a mechanism.

All the schemes analysed

show the inherent defect of basing any world order on the perpetuation of political and and social inequalities.

Which brings him back to the thesis with which he started the book—Gandhism.

The Gandhian solution for this malady is that national feeling should be placed under the guardianship of reason, morality and civilisation.

To effect this an Independent India (which will be one of the ten "Supra-National Unions" as suggested by the author) is necessary.

It would have been more convincing if the author, who has already laid the reader under a debt for the painstaking and well-documented analysis of the various World Plans and Economic and Social Orders, had used a little more argument to justify the Hindu Social Order (which he accepts) in the proposed Co-operative Commonwealth: and if he had shown how "an idyll of simple life and creative work, of sweet neighbourly love..." was to be achieved in this Commonwealth.

However, this book represents prodigious industry, and even where one does not agree with the author's contentions and conclusions, one admires his idealism, his courage and his vision of a larger world of "Supra-national Unions."

From this larger view Sir Colin Garbett* brings us back to India, more particularly to the Punjab, where he served in the Civil Service from 1905 to 1941.

Loyalties are so numerous, and so often conflicting; no matter of surprise considering for how few decades that congeries of races and tongues, creeds and customs, which comprise the subcontinent, has been compressed by British rule into that framework we call India. What Brahman, speaking of himself as an Indian, is conscious of a Bhil as a brother? What Pathan, of a Dravidian? What Parsee millionaire in Bombay, of a head-hunting Naga in the forests of Assam? The current is setting in that direction, but currents can curl and bend back on their course.

Except for one or two serious digressions such as the one just quoted his book is full of anecdotes and reminiscences told with a delightful restraint.

J. VIJAYA-TUNGA

* The author has promised to give to the Red Cross all profits which may accrue from this publication—ED.

Why Exhibit Works of Art? By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. (Luzac and Co., London. 6*s*.)

The views that Mr. Coomaraswamy puts forward in these lectures and articles on the true nature of art are not, he insists, personal. They comprise, he writes, "that doctrine of art which is intrinsic to the Philosophia Perennis and can be recognized wherever it has not been forgotten that 'culture' originates in work and not in play." As against this perennial and traditional philosophy of art he arraigns the humanistic culture of the senses and the individual sensibility by which the modern Western world has descended to subhuman levels both in its art and in its life. He is, of course, not the first to make this indictment. Thirty years ago T. E. Hulme initiated a formidable attack upon the humanistic view of art, which spread far and had many repercussions. And more recently Eric Gill never wearied of denouncing the divorce between art as a vocation necessary to human welfare and the mechanical servility of the industrial system. As a philosopher, however, Mr. Coomaraswamy is particularly well equipped to expound the traditional view of art as the imitation of eternal realities rather than of the accidents of human character and society through his equal familiarity with Eastern and Western thought. One of his chapters is characteristically entitled "The Christian and Oriental, or True, Philosophy of Art," and he quotes as freely from St. Thomas Aquinas as from the Upanishads.

As an exposure of all that is false in a merely phenomenal and individualistic view of art and of the depreciated standards of life, the mechanical slavery to which it leads, his book is quite admirable. But to me his argument is continually vitiated by a false antithesis. It begins in his downright statement that "'disinterested æsthetic contemplation' is a contradiction in terms and a pure non-sense." Later he writes that "no real distinction can be drawn between æsthetic and materialistic, *aisthesis* being sensation, and matter what can be sensed" and that "by sensibility we mean of course an emotional sensibility, physical affectability as distinguished from mental operations." This sharp distinction which he draws between sensibility, limited to the physical senses, and intellect which defines the logic of eternal mysteries, is the basis of his philosophy. Nor does he conceal his contempt for the æsthetic faculties as such. Curiously enough he never mentions the poet when he speaks of every man having by native right a vocation for art in some field. He speaks of "the carpenter, painter, lawyer, farmer or priest," but, like Plato, the master to whom he owes much, he excludes the poet from his republic. And this is significant. For the poet disproves his argument by revealing just that "disinterested æsthetic contemplation," that union of sensory and intellectual experience in imagination, of which he denies the possibility. The poet heals the feud which he would perpetuate. And so, of course, does the great artist, a Giotto or a Raphael or a Cézanne.

An iconographic art, an art which is "simply a visual theology" has its place in the development of human expression. But it does not exhaust the possibilities. Mr. Coomaraswamy applauds such a "typal art" for ex-

hibiting "universal qualities without individual peculiarity or limitations." And indeed all art to have significance must be a contemplation of the eternal form in the transitory shape. But the distinctive struggle of the modern artist is to express the typical *in* the individual, avoiding equally the abstract formality of "typal art" and the mere sensationalism of the uncentred ego. This is pre-eminently the task of the imagination. It is the incarnation of the ideal in the real, of the heavenly pattern in the earthly flux. To the imagination, which transmutes by reconciling them, senses are as holy and as necessary to art as the intellect. To Mr. Coomaraswamy they are the enemies or worthless inferiors of reason, which accounts, perhaps, for the rather pedantic reiteration in his book of certain fixed concepts, valuable as these are in refutation of every sort of false æstheticism.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

The Well of the People. By BHARATI SARABHAI. (Vishva-Bharati, Calcutta. Sole Distributors: New Book Co., Bombay. Rs. 2/-)

How a widowed old Behari woman, failing to fulfil her one desire of going to Benares for the salvation of her husband and her son asks pitifully for help in building a temple well instead, so that pilgrims may quench their thirst, is the incident round which *The Well of the People* is built. The old woman gains symbolic stature and is presented here as the problem of all planners and reformers. Shrimati Bharati Sarabhai builds on this incident a colourful pageant and a world of meaning which is charged with questions of faith and visions of destiny. The conflict between modern and ancient, idealistic and practical, is an essential part of the theme. The pilgrim motif in the Indian heart is one element of rigidity in the pattern which dominates the view—like the pathetic trust of the poor which lifts ever their weary souls in expectation of a new Avatar to redeem them from poverty, misery and exploitation.

Now the Kumbhamela at Haridwar and now the golden walls of Kashi beckon them. If the tall doorway of the Tanjore Temple fascinates from the South the eastern Jagannath calls as insistently. No sacrifice is too great if journeys to them can be compassed. Young workers dedicated for the uplift of these people and with political visions of their own for them are faced with this obdurate fact and realise that they must understand it or fail. Sanatan, Vichitra and Chetan are three representative young persons set in contrast against this age-old woman, India, even as they are set in and among themselves. And against the rigidities of the problem they stand disturbed and challenged, awed and moved.

It is in the technique of expression and in the medium used that the quality of this play consists. The author indicates the special arrangements needed for staging. Just now the play is open for "mental performance" only. The contrasts of plane and statement telescope into each other. It is an abstract mode showing more a conservatory-bred orchid than a flower growing in the open fields. This is perhaps bound to be when symbolism is meant to be conveyed. The descrip-

tion of Mother India as old, frustrated, "with accumulations of different and heavily developed civilizations on her"—misunderstood, neglected and attacked, but with a faith always firm and unquenchable, contrasting with and confounding all forecasts, forcing planners to accept her as she is and desires to be, uncoercible to alien patterns—is really good work. For India will consent to be rebuilt only on her own foundations and will demand a freshening up of those vital springs of life and feeling which can impel response in conduct in the mass of the people. What looks like imbecility to the modern is the indwelling if unreasonable faith of human beings who will put themselves to the rack rather than give up their dream of a future beyond the present, heedful only of felicities larger than the earthly.

Choruses of old women and workers are used to narrate events and to suggest context and function. They give colour-tone to the whole play and introduce what variety of incident and movement there is in it. They achieve a poetry at once technically and intrinsically moving and powerful. The stanzas have strong individuality and the lines catch up, chase, answer and assonate in rich rhythms and rimes. The imagery is full ; the springs, releases and contrasts no less than the rallies and the general organization of metrical movement—if not easy and smooth are purposive and passionate, achieving beauty in the descriptions of the moon, the bathers, the hill-scapes etc., at Haridwar, the descent of Surganga and the dreams of Kashi—quite as much as in the modern meditations of Chetan and Vichitra. If it is difficult reading and the meaning is not always obvious, it is but an invitation to the reader to make just one more effort.

The stress on practical good over wasteful pilgrim urgency is nothing new in India as even the Kabir song denotes. The comment of the workers strikes a note too loudly propagandist for a work of art ; it is too gratuitously insulting to the Liberal, and too self-righteous in praise of its own school of belief and renovation.

Shrimati Sarabhai has all the post-Hopkinsian and Eliotesque experience to sustain her in her flights of metrical and other fancy ; and her spider, weaving cobweb patterns, echoes from elsewhere. But it is always sure of itself. Its drive of thought and feeling is indicative of the full coming of age of Indo-Anglian poetry, claiming equal status as of right and worth with other contributions to English literature.

V. SITARAMIAH

Rabindranath Through Western Eyes. By A. ARONSON, M. A. (Cantab.). (Kitabistan, Allahabad. Rs. 4/8)

The meteoric rise and the gradual decline of Tagore's popularity in the West is the subject of this small book. When the Nobel Prize was awarded to him, Western critics tried to explain away the award in manifold ways. Some felt disconcerted that it was awarded to one "not white." Some attributed political motives. Many questioned the Stockholm judgment. But partisan aspersions could not suppress the work itself. It was acclaimed by men like Romain Rolland, Paul Valéry, Ezra Pound, Yeats and Gilbert Murray.

Tagore's entrance into the Western world thus caused a sensation. To

most unacquainted with Eastern modes of symbolism he was an enigma. Furthermore, though he had not directly indicted the West, intellectuals seemed suddenly to become aware of the relativity of the European concepts of progress, of the slow decay its civilisation betrayed. Self-debasing criticism best evidenced by Spengler's *Decline of the West* became the vogue and deepened sufficiently to evoke reaction and protest as in Massis's *Defence of the West.* A chaos of conflicting comments and criticisms followed. Tagore was honoured as a prophet and condemned as a hoax. France grew suspicious of German ecstasy. Italy laughed behind Tagore's back. England and America generally remained hesitant. All this because Tagore set the West a problem. The East no longer remained a political abstraction. It had produced a poet to understand whose work demanded a revaluation of values. The "exotic Eastern Sensibility" could be fitted nowhere in the patterns of traditional literary judgments. The critics could only institute comparisons without knowing the social and psychological contexts in which the work was produced. This apart, Tagore expressed, as Gilbert Murray admitted, Europe's sense of frustration and spiritual impotence during the post-war period. Detracting voices were soon drowned in the general chorus of recognition.

Thus trailed in the European sky the meteor of Tagore's fame, leaving behind critical confusion, political pre-occupation and racial prejudice. The author sees Germany's enthusiasm for Tagore as evidence of the fascination which the irrational and the pseudo-mystic had for her. This may not appeal to many who will also feel that the Continental response, particularly when reactionary, has received more attention than either British or American reactions. But the book, a proof of industry and critical perception, offers an apt and stimulating commentary.

V. M. INAMDAR

The Mevlidi Sherif. By SULEYMAN CHELEBI; trans. by F. LYMAN MACCULLUM. (The Wisdom of the East Series, John Murray, London. 1s. 6*d.*)

The Mevlidi Sherif is a hymn of devotion recounting the wonders of the Prophet's birth and experiences. The original title of "The Birth-Song of the Prophet" was more comprehensive: *Vesilatun Nedjat* (The Means of Deliverance).

The author was one of the earliest Ottoman poets. He is said to have composed these couplets in 1409, but the oldest MSS. now known belong to two centuries later. Although claimed as true copies, they vary in length. The present translation contains 263 couplets as in the original Turkish printed edition.

Special celebrations in connection with the Prophet's birthday were first instituted in 1208 in North-Eastern Iraq, at Arbela, now called Erbil, where Darius was defeated by Alexander the Great. It is said that the *Mevlid* was composed to provide a hymn of Turkish origin to replace the Arabic devotional chants previously used. The celebrations, which included parades, torchlight processions and feasts, were objected to by orthodox Muslims as contrary to early Islamic custom.

Readers will recognize in the poem

much that corresponds with teachings of Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism.

From the point of view of literary merit, some couplets are a great deal stronger than others. Apart from the beauty of the subject, the poem as a whole scarcely reaches the high standard of literary excellence of Sir Edwin Arnold's classic, with which it may be compared. Nor has it the imagery, power and terseness of such productions of Mahommedan genius as the philosophy of Omar Khayyam and other Persian poems. It is perhaps not entirely permissible, however, to compare a psalm composed for ceremonial chanting with purely literary productions. As a psalm it is an expression of religious devotion and anything that it loses in power it gains in pure aspiration and beauty of theme.

Turning to the song itself, we find it a statement of spiritual truths based upon mystical interpretation rather than human understanding. This does not mean that it is not to be accepted literally, just as the psalms are to be taken literally in the sense of actuality or immanence—facts of Spiritual consciousness to be realized now in experience.

First comes the invocation in which certain universal truths are affirmed—the unity of God, his omnipotence and omnipresence, his action in work and his help in trouble. God is all and all is God. The couplets following extol the power of man as conceived by God and tell of the enlightened prophets to the time of Mahommed. This differs from the Christian account and Allah becomes more comparable to Brahman, for "While yet the worlds were not, Allah had being."

A description of the Prophet's birth follows, which bears much similarity to that recounted of the Buddha. The Prophet's mother, Amine, is pleasingly called the "Mother of Pearl," "her one Pearl like none other." Her experiences at the time of the birth are much like those of Queen Maya, the mother of Gautama, as recorded in *The Light of Asia*. The same subjective light is seen by both mothers; similar rose odours fill the air. In both cases there are earth tremors and similar portents. Winged horses are common to both great teachers. Both are born perfect and perfectly marked and while the Prophet prays at birth, "My people, oh, my people," the infant Buddha declares, "I come to help the world."

In the following couplets, a description of the Prophet's heavenly journey is given. The ladder of light by which the Prophet ascended suggests a symbolical correspondence with the ladder by which Zoroaster climbed from earth, and also with that of Jacob's vision.

The lifting of the veils brought the Prophet finally to the Divine Presence and a mystical communion ensued during which six aspects of the Divinity were revealed. In this there seem to be certain correspondences with Krishna's revelation to Arjuna, in a general rather than a particular sense.

The final lines petition for forgiveness of transgressions through the intercession of the Prophet and end with a prayer for Divine acceptance of the song.

Although Republican Turkey no longer regards herself officially as an Islamic State and the teaching of Islam is forbidden in the schools, the introduction to the present translation states that the *Mevlid* continues to be chanted on special occasions.

L. E. PARKER

Asia and Democracy. By PEARL S. BUCK. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 4*s*. 6*d*.)

That the white peoples are prone, in the heat of their own struggle, to overlook or postpone the problem of their relation to the coloured peoples is depressingly true, and this unrealistic attitude Miss Buck roundly trounces in these ten articles, speeches and letters to the press; as she pointedly says, the end of our war is not the end of war for many of the coloured peoples, who will still have to fight for freedom from us. Miss Buck is in a strong position where the whole question of white and coloured races, their differing attitudes to the present war and their relative attitudes one to another are concerned; she is a white woman whose knowledge of coloured peoples and their countries gives her a steady view of the laws of God and nature which, while they apply to all races, appear to each race to apply only to themselves; she stands in the middle position; she can see both sides. Perhaps the best evidence of this is contained in her admirable essay on "The Chinese Mind and India." Here is real understanding and something more than the statement of a problem, for her championship of "the flexible mind" as it appears to her in the Chinese people offers a true solution, one which goes deeper than political and economic panaceas and touches the psychological and spiritual foundations of personal and national relationship.

Yet this little book has the defects of its virtues. The middle position is strictly untenable if it is made no more than a dualistic understanding, if it is not made a synthesis of two understandings, and this synthesis Miss Buck does not always achieve. There is real wisdom in some of her remarks on "Women and Victory," on the essential nature and provenance of national unity. But some of her pronouncements on the Western side of the dualism tend to be vague and unsatisfactory, and the Western attitude, do what she will, mars certain of her conclusions. It seems a pity, for instance, that the simile she chooses for contemporary China, the Sleeping Dragon at last awakened, should be "a clear-eyed young man, an air pilot, ready to take off for the future"; and there is but shallow psychology in her enjoinder that the schizophrenia which saps the life of modern Western man must only be "rejected" to be healed. She has too vague a reverence for "freedom" ("freedom for all" is a stirring cry, but we must know what the phrase means, and what freedom itself); the nearness of the war, in several other instances, seems to be inclined to obscure her vision.

While admiring Miss Buck's understanding of Eastern belief and behaviour, we are forced at times to distrust her understanding of Western belief and behaviour, and therefore some of the conclusions she reaches concerning these things in relation. It will be good for us to take the medicine she offers us in regard to Chinese, Indians, Africans; but there is a sense in which we need something other than physic: often it is the persecutor, rather than the persecuted, who requires to be understood, pitied, and so healed by subtler than "physical" means.

But it is wrong, perhaps, to criticize too deeply a book which would claim

to be no more than a primer. *Asia and Democracy* is a good primer, reasonable and humane, representing what Miss Buck very evidently regards as part of her particular war-service, a social service to humanity in general in its present plight.

R. H. WARD

Modern Indian Culture. By D. P. MUKERJI. (India Publishers, 18, Tagore Town, Allahabad. Rs. 4/12)

Professor Mukerji has more than the usual qualifications for tackling a subject like Modern Indian Culture. First, he is a Bengali, and it was in Bengal that modern Indian literature as well as "modern" Indian painting and music came into being; and it was in Bengal that the *Bhadra lok* class, the "middle-middle" class as he terms it, arose; and Bengal's is the claim of having produced India's most famous poet and composer of modern times. Then, his long residence in the United Provinces enables him to speak with first-hand authority on the cultural changes in the northern provinces. Another qualification is that he is a sociologist. Only a sociologist would regard the insanitary condition of our city tenements as coming within the purview of Culture. For Culture is not an excrescence to be viewed æsthetically or intellectually but something that grows deep in the soil of a country as much as in the soil of our hearts.

From architecture to drama, radio, cinema and folk-song—the spuriousness which overlies most artistic endeavour in these respective fields in India is due to the rise of that new class created, as Professor Mukerji says, by European Commerce-Capital. This artificial creation by the East India Company of a new "landlordism" and a new class of "bankers" is, according to Professor Mukerji, a piece of "incompetent social surgery." And he traces our intellectual poverty today, as well as "the fissiparous tendencies in the Indian traditions that have led to the postulation of a two-nation theory, the Hindu, and the Muslim," to that bad surgery.

Having surveyed the background of modern Indian culture in the first three chapters—and the brief survey takes us as far back as the Buddhist period—Professor Mukerji analyses in the remaining five chapters modern Indian literature, the various schools of Indian painting and Indian music, not to mention the radio, the cinema and architecture. Of Architecture he says that it is "the most social and yet the least progressive in India." He is so refreshingly outspoken that the temptation to quote him at length is strong. For example :—

> In whichever linguistic area the new Bhadra lok class sprang up, the new literature developed, and wherever it developed it was reeking with emotions. Any drama, any Indian film, mythological or social, is a waste of tears in an expanse of shame.

There is, he adds, already a revolt against such mediocrity. The most fruitful field has been Music, and in surveying the influences and contributions there, he pays high tribute to Tagore and Professor Bhatkhande.

He concludes this admirably critical book by making a plea for eschewing hatred and for comprehending "the spirit of Indian traditions" and orienting "that spirit in the light of the collective life of the people."

J. VIJAYA-TUNGA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

Shri Ramananda Chatterjee, the veteran founder-editor of *The Modern Review* and *Prabasi*, died at Calcutta on the 30th of September. The passing of this great journalist at the age of seventy-nine years underlines the comments in our September pages on the responsibility and the power of the press. That responsibility he fully recognised; that power he wielded conscientiously and bravely for decades. He was an educationist before he was a journalist. In leaving the class room he did not desert the educational field; he but found a wider rostrum. His life was dedicated to our country's freedom and our country's good; in a sense the two are synonymous.

We are glad to number Shri Ramananda Chatterjee among the earliest collaborators in the idealistic effort which THE ARYAN PATH represents. Perhaps he never phrased more clearly his conviction of the seriousness of his calling than in "The Press in India," which he contributed to our pages in February 1931. He referred to the many pressures brought to bear on editors from proprietors, readers, advertisers, the ruling bureaucracy. And he added :—

> Having to serve so many masters, we may seek to be excused for not listening above all to the voice of the Master within, speaking through our conscience. But there can be no excuse. Ours is a sacred duty. We must not sacrifice our convictions for any advantage whatsoever. Great is the temptation to play to the gallery; but our task is to enlighten, mould and guide as well as to give publicity to public opinion.

Well for the country that sets a proper value upon moral worth! The recent tributes to Shri Ramananda have been spontaneous and, we doubt not, genuine. But the highest tribute will be emulation of the spirit to which he gave expression in those words.

Time was that such a gesture of appreciation of our ancient culture as the appeal in *The Times* of 11th October for support to the India Society would have been gratefully received in India. But the bridge that would once have spanned a gulf may be too short when the gulf has widened, as it has between the English mind and ours. The appeal is impressively supported. The signatories include the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy Designate. Those who know the kind of information about India which the India Society sometimes disseminates will not be too sanguine. The purpose of the Society is to "unite its members in study and admiration of those aspects of Indian culture whose beauty and nobility can be recognised and appreciated by all." Even by the English? Despite three centuries of political contact, the signatories have to confess that studies of Indian art, literature and archæology have less recognition in Britain than on the Continent. We have long since resigned ourselves to English indifference to our

penates. As far as we are concerned, we should be tempted to exclaim with the ancient Indian poet, "For my sins, O four-faced God, punish me as you will, but spare me the fate of having to submit delicate things of beauty to the obtuse!" But there is more to the question than our feelings. It is profoundly true, as the signatories recognise, that enduring good relations between Britain and India will turn in part upon a sympathetic understanding of each other's cultural and spiritual background. Only how genuine can be the mutual appreciation between the foreign rulers and the restive ruled?

How deep goes the sudden contrition of the U. S. A. for what President Roosevelt has called the "historic mistake" of the Chinese Exclusion Act? In his message to Congress on the 11th October he described the then pending repeal legislation as the righting of "injustice to our friends," and a proof that the U. S. A. would regard China "as a partner in the days of peace." So far, so good. But the immediately following sentence is sinister :—

> While it would give the Chinese a preferred status over certain other Oriental people their great contribution to the cause of democracy and freedom entitles them to such preference.

Such a comparison is invidious and unfair. If India were free to express her just resentment it would never have been made. But the issue goes deeper than that. President Roosevelt's statement *could* never have been made if the defenders of "the cause of democracy and freedom" had applied in India the principles that they profess. Liberty and Independence are the breath of life to India. She would have yielded place to none in sacrifice to save them. *The Herald Tribune's* remark supporting Chinese Exclusion Act repeal surely applies to India as well as to China. "It is not necessary," the Editor declared, "for us to insult a people on whose fortitude and friendship our own national safety is now so immediately dependent."

Self-interest and magnanimity for once combining forces, the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act became practical politics. If only the rising tide of good feeling had been availed of to wash from the statute-books all the discriminatory features of the immigration laws which insult Asiatics generally! The effect upon race relations throughout the world would have been electric and far-reaching. A golden opportunity was missed!

The rallying cry of the idealist is today a voice in the wilderness of false values and moral confusion. Ralph Tyler Flewelling's editorial in the Summer 1943 *Personalist* is such a cry. He does not minimise the complexity of the post-war problem or the urgency of the unspent forces which have already swept away so many of our landmarks. The devastated post-war world will demand re-education—"an education that not only sharpens the intellect to a cutting edge but trains equally in a sense of moral responsibility." Much of what now passes as scientific, he declares, will be unavailable for such a true education, having already demonstrated a moral incapacity. Cultural aims in education have been disparaged as "too vaguely idealistic and impractical," and "getting on in the world" held up to the young as an ideal.

For several generations men who professed learning have worked with might and main to convince students of the foolishness of religion and the unreality of moral values.... The mechanistic type of learning is blind to these deeper truths of the human spirit that provide the emotions and the moral drive. If we of the western world survive it will be because in spite of our efforts in the opposite direction much of the older moral culture remains un-uprooted from our common life but persists in tradition and feeling. That which much learning has attempted to discard from consciousness becomes now our main hope.

There are, Mr. Flewelling reminds his readers, "moral laws in human society that can no more be suspended than the law of gravitation....We are having to re-learn this lesson in the hard way." The problems we face are indeed, as he sees, more moral and spiritual than economic and national. The present difficulty will not be over until, somehow "good faith shall be restored to the earth."

It can never be so long as we think of our physical comfort, our financial interests, our national prosperity, more than we think of keeping our promises, doing justly, and seeking righteousness in the earth.

In an excellent article, "Plans for Peace Must Include Education" (*The New York Times Magazine*, 11th July) Mr. James Marshall pleads for a basic reorientation of attitude toward the problems of peace and war. This orientation, he suggests, is the task of and can be achieved by revised educational methods which must occupy the minds of all those who plan for the future. He demands "a place for the children in the peace." If the world is to be "free from anxiety and danger and want" it must be given "the means to develop positive international attitudes, a sense of world citizenship."

Peace plans today, he says, fall into three categories. First, the *laissez-faire*, *i. e.*, "trusting to a mysterious good-will" and letting things take their own course. This attitude obviously can be of no help since without right motive and proper initiative the future can only be more disastrous than the present. The approach of the second group of plans is "a rumble of force." They emphasise an international organisation with economic sanctions and an international police force, "controlled by cliques of governments or monopolistic parties, not by people." The third group of plans with its preoccupation with Marxism and economic reorganisation sees a panacea in the elimination of class strife between the haves and the have-nots. But economics is not the whole of life.

"None of these principal plans," says Mr. Marshall, "treat of man as a human being, as a being whose machinery of state and economic organization have continually gone askew if they have not been motivated by moral ends and directed with a recognition of man's needs and drives for satisfaction."

Unless men first realise that there must be equality of treatment of all peoples, irrespective of race, creed and colour, there can be no assurance of international political stability. Unless men first feel that they are citizens of the world there can be no enduring commonwealth of nations, no stable economic solution.

This realisation, which must be the foundation of all planning, if planning is going to do the world any good, can be brought to the peoples not by fiat but by education from the nursery school to university and adult education. The programme must be

to make all people alive to the dangers of aggression, of competition and of the power

struggle, until we convince a large part of mankind that the golden rule is not sappy, is not sentimental, but is based on sound psychological needs for equality, fraternity and co-operation.

Economic reconstruction must be supplemented by mutual understanding and willingness to share, a preparedness to merge differences, religious, racial and cultural, in the basic fact of common humanity. An international machinery for a system of world-wide education needs to be planned. And, as Mr. Marshall pertinently suggests, "all the education is not needed by the Axis." And he points the lesson for his American readers by demanding the removal of "our sense of white superiority" as well as the paternalism of imperialist Britain and bureaucratic Russia. The manner in which the Scandinavian nations settled their age-old differences, particularly the manner in which the commission in charge of editing text-books removed all matters detrimental to mutual good-will, is indicated as a valuable pointer to the way in which an international scheme for world education can successfully function.

The meaning of life must be found in the Philosophy of the Whole, writes Prof. T. J. Haarhoff of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in *The Hibbert Journal* for July. He refers to the ancient, recurrent dream that "harmony is our goal and life, in various forms, a gradual growth towards it." He sees the root of our present misery in the pursuit of the wrong things—power, gain, etc., and not "the inner harmony that is the earnest of external harmony."

By way or illustration, Profess Haarhoff surveys the internation drama of the last few years, traci punishment back to guilt witho partiality.

We, too, broke the law....We glossed o the injustices of Versailles. England in 19 wanted to help struggling Republican G many. France blocked the way. Engla yielded: because "we can't afford to offe France. French cannon could reach acro the Straits of Dover." Result: the rise Hitler; the fall of France; German cann shooting across the Straits of Dover.

"'Peace,' said Litvinoff, 'is i divisible.'" And Professor Haarho believes also that "disasters on a bi scale begin with the individual." Pu those incontestible truths side by sid and you have the justification of hi apprehension of danger in a philosoph of separateness. India has reason t feel the full force of the regret of broad-minded South African tha "some of our children grow up believ ing that race hatred, race domination isolationism, intrigue and violence ar good things." But it is not enough t rest on the conviction that "thes things will pass away because they ar ultimately against the whole meanin of life."

Pathos, Mathos said the Greek tragedian by suffering we learn; but very slowly.

Children take their attitudes in many perhaps in most, cases from their elders "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set o edge." The acquiring of the righ attitude on the part of the moulders o youthful thought will save much suff ering to the young and their world o the future.